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Abstract
This article describes the profound changes to American Indian kinship and
social structures caused when European and Anglo American legal norms were
imposed on American Indian tribes without respect for Indian culture or
values. Although these sovereign nations were entitled to self-determination,
they were for centuries subjected to laws crafted without their input or
representation. This article takes the position that law should come from
within a culture to ensure that it reflects that culture's values and permits it to
flourish in its own way. When law is imposed by outsiders, it becomes a
means of colonization, forcing one group to conform to another culture's
expectations and beliefs. This process can be seen in the relationship of
United States law to American Indian tribes-a relationship in which tribes
were placed under the control of a legal system that all too often failed to
incorporate or reflect tribal values.
Thirty years ago, Congress took one step forward to rectify this history.
Recognizing the tribes' right to cultural autonomy, Congress permitted
American Indians to bring their own cultural norms to the table and have them
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recognized in laws such as the Indian Child Welfare Act. But that progress
has been short-lived. State courts have thwarted ICWA's full potential
through the judicially created "existing Indian family exception," which denies
ICWA application in defiance of the Act's plain language, Supreme Court
precedent, and congressional intent. Under this exception, tribes are once
again being subjected to laws that regulate and define Indian family and social
life without benefit of the tribes' input. To remedy this, I propose that
Congress must act to halt the states' grab, so that ICWA lives up to its promise
to permit the tribes to control their own cultural futures.
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Introduction
In 1831, the Choctaw Indians were forced from their land in the eastern
United States to lands in Oklahoma in what would later become known as the
Trail of Tears.' At the time of the tribe's removal, Choctaw Chief George W.
Harkins drafted a Farewell Letter to the American People to explain why the
tribe had agreed to removal.2 In his letter, Harkins noted that the Choctaw
viewed removal as the lesser of two evils The greater evil, he explained, was
the insistence of the State of Mississippi on legislating the affairs of the tribe
1. ALICE BECK KEHOE, NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS: A COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT 188
(2d ed. 1992).
2. Letter from Choctaw Chief George W. Harkins to the American People, in GREAT
DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY 152 (1973). In his letter, Harkins noted why it was
incorrect to characterize the Choctaw's decision as a "choice." See id.
3. Id.
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and its citizens.4 According to Harkins, "[a]lthough the legislature of the state
were qualified to make laws for their own citizens, that did not qualify them
to become law makers to a people who were so dissimilar in manners and
customs as the Choctaws are to the Mississippians."' The Choctaw, Harkins
wrote, "rather chose to suffer and be free, than live under the degrading
influence of laws, which our voice could not be heard in their formation."6
It is remarkable the tribe viewed removal from its ancestral lands-which
divided the Choctaw tribe and ultimately resulted in the death of
approximately twenty-five percent of its members-as preferable to being
subject to laws drafted without their input. Harkins's words reflect the
unfairness of one group imposing its laws on another without respect to that
group's culture or values. As a consequence of that process, law becomes a
colonizing tool, whereby one group subjects another to its values and norms,
forcing the subjugated group to conform to another culture's expectations and
beliefs.7
This process can be seen in the relationship of United States law to
American Indian' tribes; a relationship in which tribes were placed under the
control of a legal system that all too often failed to incorporate or reflect tribal
values. Although removal was viewed as a means to escape rule by laws
designed without their input, the history of the Choctaw, and of all American
Indian tribes, belies that promise. Even after removal, American Indian tribes
continued to be dominated by laws drafted without their input. Indeed, for
much of the history between Anglo Americans and American Indians, tribal
values were ignored either due to unfamiliarity with those values or in a willful
attempt to bring the tribes into conformity with Anglo-American culture.9
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction, and
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REv. 585, 593 (1994) (noting that when law
prescribes it "casts the shadow of the legal subject beyond its internal discursive confines by
imposing it on other cultural artifacts"). But see Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence
and Cultural Meanings of the Family, 79 NEB. L. REv. 577, 578 (2000).
8. In this article the terms "American Indian," "Native American," and "Indian" will be
used interchangeably. "Indian" is used in most legal literature to describe persons who are
members (or eligible for membership) of a federally-recognized tribe. Under the main act
described in this paper-the Indian Child Welfare Act-the child of such a person is referred
to as an Indian child. Most native people refer to themselves by tribal name. Where possible
I will abide by this preference, using tribal affiliation when referring to incidents specific to one
tribe.
9. See Rennard J. Strickland, Native Americans, in THE OxFoRD COMPANION TO THE
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Consequently, these cultures changed as they came under pressure from
culturally unfamiliar laws they were forced to either adapt to or resist.'
In this paper I will show how law-generally understood as reflecting the
values and beliefs of a particular culture---can change an indigenous culture
when it is imposed from without. Using the case of the Choctaw, I will
describe the impact U.S. law had on their kinship and social system. In Part
I, I compare the pre-contact social organization of the Choctaw with that of the
present-day Choctaw of Mississippi." As a consequence of hundreds of years
of imposition of laws designed by those who did not recognize or understand
their culture, the Choctaw social and family structure has undergone profound
changes. Part II then examines how U.S. laws changed the Choctaw kinship
system." Specifically, it discusses how changes in federal Indian law and
policy affected the family and social structure of the Choctaw.
In Part III, I discuss how the Indian Child Welfare Act represents a
departure from the earlier imposition of law from without by providing for the
inclusion of American Indian perspectives. ICWA's break from the past
provides the tribes with the ability to control their cultural futures. 3 However,
that potential has been thwarted by state courts that seek to avoid ICWA
application by once again imposing laws designed by non-Indians to regulate
and define Indian family and social life. In Part IV, I argue that the judicially
created "existing Indian family exception" to ICWA flies in the face of
congressional intent to have a law that reflects American Indian culture.'4 The
harm this exception engenders not only defies the plain language of the Act
and Supreme Court precedent, it also threatens to once again place the tribes
under the control of a law that does little to recognize their right to define who
they are and to have laws that reflect their culture and values.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 577 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
10. Alexis de Tocqueville, in Democracy in America, charged that the United States was
able to both exterminate much of the native population and deny rights to the survivors "with
singular felicity, tranquilly, legally, philanthropically... and without violating a single great
principle of morality in the eyes of the world." 1 ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA: THE HENRY REEVE TExT AS REVISED BY FRANCIS BOWEN 355 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
1945) (1831). He concluded that "[i]t is impossible to destroy men with more respect for the
laws of humanity." Id.
11. See infra Part I.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
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L Background: Contact & Cultural Change
Law in the United States reflects a European legal tradition extending back
at least as far as the legal systems of ancient Greece and Rome. 5 Rejecting the
Divine Right of Kings, John Locke envisioned government based on a social
contract made by free individuals. 16 In such a construction, the individual is
of paramount importance. United States law reflects this approach through its
emphasis on the individual "natural rights-bearing person" who possesses the
capacity to exercise her rights as well as the freedom to exercise them against
larger societal interests. 7
In contrast, American Indians typically conceive of legal relations as
existing between groups, not individuals." This is not to suggest that
American Indian tribes are a monolith.'9 They surely are not. There are more
15. See Michael William Dowdle, Of Parliaments, Pragmatism, and the Dynamics of
Constitutional Development: The Curious Case of China, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 188-
89 (2002) ("Many of the defining normative procedures of modem U.S. constitutionalism were
actually discovered by institutions that lacked any real resemblance to today's conceptions of
democratic legitimacy-including not only those of Republican Rome and premodern England,
but also those of ancient Greece, the medieval Papacy, Islamic law, and imperial China.").
16. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
87 (1997); see also I ALFRED H. KELLY, WINFRED A. HARBISON & HERMAN BELZ, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 36 (7th ed. 1991). Although the
issue is too complex to enter into at length here, it is important to point out that this idea was
much debated prior to the Civil War. Opponents claimed that the Constitution more rightly
represents a compact between the several states in which the people reside. Within those states,
however, the individual would still be the rights-bearer. Proponents of this view-such as John
C. Calhoun---offered this interpretation to bolster their belief that the states were free to exit the
compact at any time. The Civil War resolved this ideological split in favor of the view that the
Constitution represents the individuals of the United States who constitute a federal
government, although this conclusion is not without conflict. See generally DONALD S. LUTZ,
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONsTrUTIONAusM (1988).
17. Carriere, supra note 7, at 594; Lawrence Rosen, The Right to Be Different: Indigenous
Peoples and the Quest for a Unified Theory, 107 YALE L.J. 227, 227 (1997) (book review)
(noting "American tendency to cast issues predominantly in terms of individual rights rather
than of collective rights"); see generally Lawrence Rosen, Individualism, Community, and the
Law: A Review Essay, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1988) (reviewing the issues raised by de
Tocqueville, as addressed by more recent writers).
18. VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 80
(1983).
19. See Stuart Ford, OSCE National Minority Rights in the United States: The Limits of
Conflict Prevention, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 44 (1999); see also Gavin Clarkson,
Racial Imagery and Native Americans: A First Look at the Empirical Evidence Behind the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
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than five hundred federally recognized tribes in the United States today, and
each tribe has its own unique history and culture.20 American Indians speak
more than one hundred different languages and exhibit a variety of religious
beliefs. 2' Nevertheless, some features are common to Indian cultures,
including the greater value placed on the tribal group and the belief that the
whole is necessary for the existence of the individual.22 This concept is passed
on to each succeeding generation through tribal social structures and oral
histories.23
Despite the value tribes place on the group over the individual, the lives of
American Indians are dominated by U.S. laws that emphasize the individual
over the group. American Indians are subject to federal laws, congressional
policies, and federal agencies. Separate and apart from the laws that affect all
Americans, more than four thousand federal laws and treaties concern
American Indians-laws that have been interpreted in thousands of court
decisions.24 In addition, there are numerous tribal laws, state laws,
administrative rulings, and Bureau of Indian Affairs directives that also impact
tribes and their members. Many of these laws and regulations were
implemented with little, if any, tribal input.
Understanding the impact these laws have on a culture that emphasizes
group rights requires an understanding of the historical, economic, political,
social, and moral problems in which those laws were conceived and
implemented.26 Similarly, to fully understand the impact of these laws on the
lives of American Indians, it is important to first understand the history of
contact between Europeans and American Indian tribes. To facilitate that
understanding, this paper will focus on the experience of one tribe, the
Choctaw of Mississippi, and how the tribe changed after it was brought under
the influence of Anglo-American laws.
Indian Mascot Controversy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 393, 400 (2003).
20. Ford, supra note 19, at 44; see also Clarkson, supra note 19, at 400.
21. Ford, supra note 19, at 44; see also Clarkson, supra note 19, at 400.
22. B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act - The Need for a Separate Law, COMPLEAT
LAWYER (Am. Bar Ass'n, Chicago, I11.), Fall 1996, at 18, 23, available at http://www.abanet.
org/genpractice/magazine/1995/fall/indianchildwelfareact.html (last visited July 15, 2009).
23. Id.
24. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton et
al. eds., Michie 2005).
25. Strickland, supra note 9, at 578.
26. Id. (quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter).
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A. The Pre-Contact Kinship & Social Structure of the Choctaw
Before contact with Europeans, the Choctaw occupied the southeastern
portion of North America, predominately in what is now eastern Mississippi."
Although it would later change, the family, social, and political structure of the
pre-contact Choctaw was organized along maternal lineages.2"
Pre-contact Choctaw were matriloca 29 as well as being matrilineal. This
meant that each household was centered on the mother's family residence and
consisted of an extended family that included three or four generations of the
mother's kin.3" This extended kin network was provided by the division of
Choctaw society into two social categories called moieties.3 Descent and
inheritance were traced through the matrilineage, with the mother's moiety
determining her child's.32 The moieties also regulated marriage-individuals
within the same moieties could not intermarry.33
27. See JESSE 0. McKEE & JON A. SCHLENKER, THE CHOCTAWS: CULTURAL EVOLUTION
OF A NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBE 42 (1980) (map of the Old Choctaw Country); Gavin Clarkson,
Reclaiming Jurisprudential Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary Analysis, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 473,
473 n.4 (2002) ("The Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma is one of three federally recognized tribes
of Choctaws. The others include the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, which remains on
a reservation within the aboriginal Choctaw territory.").
28. FRED EGGAN, THE AMERICAN INDIAN: PERSPECTIVES FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL
CHANGE 24 (1966).
29. See Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, A Human Capital-Based Theory Of
Postmarital Residence Rules, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 208, 209 (2007). "Matrilocal" indicates
a kinship structure in which adult daughters remain with their families, including after marriage.
Thus, a couple would reside in the vicinity of the wife's family rather than with the husband's
family. Id.
30. EGGAN, supra note 28, at 24.
31. Moieties "divide a society into two social categories determined by descent, each
consisting of half that society's clans." DICTIONARYOFANTHROPOLOGY 327 (Thomas Barfield
ed., 1997). Clans are "unilineal descent groups that unite a series of lineages descended from
a theoretical common ancestor." Id. at 62. In the case of the Choctaw, the clans were
traditionally matriclans in which descent is traced by the matrilineage. Fred Eggan, Historical
Changes in the Choctaw Kinship System, AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST, Jan./Mar. 1937, at 35.
32. Clara Sue Kidwell, Choctaw, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 119,
119 (Frederick E. Hoxie ed., 1996) ("Children belonged to their mother's [clan], and people
were required to marry into the opposite [clan]."); MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 27;
Eggan, supra note 31, at 35.
33. MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 27; ALEXANDER SPOEHR, CHANGING KINSHIP
SYSTEMS: A STUDY IN THE ACCULTURATION OF THE CREEKS, CHEROKEE, AND CHOCTAW
(1947), reprinted in 33 FIELD MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY, PUBLICATIONS OF THE FIELD
MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY 207 (1976).
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In the Choctaw family, the mother's brother was the source of family
authority, and it was he who was generally responsible for the family's
welfare.3" For instance, the mother's brother was the primary influence in
marriage arrangements and in educating his sister's children. 35 Although they
did participate in public ceremonies, fathers otherwise played minor roles in
their children's lives.36 Instead, a man's responsibilities were to his sister's
children. a7
The matrilineage provided a kinship structure that would provide for the
care of children in the event of any family disruption. For instance, following
a divorce, children remained with their mother.3" If the mother died, her
lineage had a priority claim over her children superior to that of the father,
who had no authority over them.39 The extended kin network ensured that a
relative, perhaps one more distant, could step in to fulfill family obligations if
a more immediate relative was absent.4 Indeed, because the extended kin
group was involved in raising the children, there was virtually no such thing
as an orphaned child in pre-contact Choctaw culture.4 ' During this time
period, adoption was common, even by families with many children.42 An
adoption was formalized through the symbolic act of the child eating from the
family bowl.4
3
34. See Morris S. Arnold, The Tenth Annual Brendan F. Brown Lecture Loyola University
School of Law Cultural Imperialism and the Legal System: The Application of European Law
to Indians in Colonial Louisiana, 42 LoY. L. REV. 727, 735 n.29 (1997); Eggan, supra note 31,
at 50.
35. 1 J.F.H. CLAIBORNE, MISSISSIPPI AS A PROVINCE, TERRITORY, AND STATE 516-17
(Jackson, Miss., Power & Barksdale 1880); ANGIE DEBO, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHOCTAW
REPuBuc 16 (2d ed. 1961); McKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 30.
36. EGGAN, supra note 28, at 24 ("The father and his relatives played a relatively minor
role in these activities but were particularly important at life crises and on public ceremonial
occasions.").
37. Id.
38. CLAIBORNE, supra note 35, at 517 ("The marriage endures only during the affection or
inclination of the parties, and either may dissolve it at pleasure. This, of course, very often
occurs, in which case the children follow the mother; the father has no control over them
whatever.").
39. BUREAU OF AM. ETHNOLOGY, SMITHSONIAN INST., BULLETIN 103 (1931), reprinted in
JOHN R. SWANTON, SOURCE MATERIAL FOR THE SOCIAL AND CEREMONIAL LIFE OF THE
CHOCTAW INDIANS 125, 131 (2001) (quoting CLAIBORNE, supra note 35).
40. SPOEHR, supra note 33, at 206.
41. CLAIBORNE, supra note 35, at 523; DEBO, supra note 35, at 16-17.
42. CLAIBORNE, supra note 35, at 523.
43. MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 28 (citing DEBO, supra note 35, at 16-17).
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The Choctaw lived in loosely formed villages on land held in common.'
Although individual homes were scattered, they were nonetheless concentrated
enough to ensure daily personal contact among members of a lineage."
Villages contained a number of matrilineages and clans and were organized
around a ceremonial center, with individual houses surrounded by cornfields.'
Choctaw villages were organized by extended kin groups and governed by a
chief and a council of elders.47 The Choctaw held their land in common,
though the right to use certain parcels of land was granted to individuals.4 8
The matrilineage also formed the underlying basis of the social structure of
early Choctaw communities.4 9 The moieties that formed the backbone of the
social structure were also the source of the political structure. Each moiety
was divided into clans and the political and religious leaders came from the
principal clan of each moietyf ° Political power was passed through the
mother's lineage, with chiefdoms descending from mother's brother to
mother's son.5
In the centuries since the pre-contact time period, the Choctaw have been
increasingly influenced by the culture of Europeans. This contact started with
Spanish conquistador Hernando de Soto's travel into the southeast region of
North America in the early sixteenth century, 2 continued as waves of settlers
moved into Choctaw territory," and reached its highest level after the end of
the American Revolutionary War when U.S. law and custom most directly
began to change the traditional Choctaw kinship system and social structure.
As a consequence of contact and the imposition of laws drafted without respect
44. Id at 17.
45. SPOEHR, supra note 33, at 210.
46. Kidwell, supra note 32, at 119.
47. For a chart of the early Mississippi tribal organization, see MCKEE & SCHLENKER,
supra note 27, at 16. The Choctaw's territory was divided into three different districts led by
its own chief. Kidwell, supra note 32, at 119. These geographical regions were represented in
a general council that met with the principal chiefs of each district in a national tribal
government governed jointly by the three district chiefs. Id. Villages were relatively
independent of each other, despite the central district government. EGGAN, supra note 28, at
19.
48. McKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 41.
49. Id. at 27; SPOEHR, supra note 33, at 207.
50. McKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 16.
51. Kidwell, supra note 32, at 119.
52. See William C. Sturtevant, Spanish-Indian Relations in Southeastern North America,
9 ETHNOmSTORY 41, 47-48 (1962).
53. See Kidwell, supra note 32, at 120; Sturtevant, supra note 52, at 47-48.
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to Choctaw culture, the Choctaw kinship and social structure of today is very
different from what it was before European contact.
B. The Post-Contact Kinship & Social Structure of the Choctaw
In his 1966 study of the Five Civilized Tribes of the Southeast,
anthropologist Fred Eggan found that in the current Choctaw kinship system,
the family pattern had become almost completely reversed.54 Eggan found
that, among the Choctaw, "there is a close correlation between the degree of
acculturation and the degree of modification of the kinship pattern."" Eggan
concluded that the kinship system typical of tribes in the Southeast had
changed as a result of contact with Europeans and acculturation.
6
This change was rather profound. Today, there are approximately nine
thousand members of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, the majority
of whom live on twenty-one thousand acres of reserved land in seven
communities.57 Choctaw communities resemble Euro-American communities,
with homes centered around churches and schools.5" Similarly, while many
traditional practices continue, they have been altered by the Choctaws' contact
and experiences with Anglo-America.5 9 For instance, despite the impact on
their kinship system, the Choctaw continue to support "kin and locality-based
sports."
Similarly, Choctaw family structure has come to resemble the patrilineal
European model, with an increased emphasis on the nuclear family of parents
54. See EGGAN, supra note 28, at 20.
55. Id. at 37.
56. Eggan's student, Alexander Spoehr, found similar changes in his 1947 study of
Oklahoma Choctaw kinship. Spoehr noted that the Choctaw's aboriginal kinship practice had
changed remarkably since contact with Europeans, shifting from a matrilineal emphasis to a
patrilineal one in which descent is traced through father's sister. SPOEHR, supra note 33, at 197.
He also noted that it had begun to shift away from a lineage system to a generational system.
Spoehr found that the importance of moieties in Choctaw life had declined, so that few, if any,
Choctaw remembered any distinction "between local groups, moieties, and clans." Id. at 209.
57. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, Welcome from Miko Beasley Denson, http://www.
choctaw.org (follow "Welcome from Miko Beasley Denson" hyperlink under the "Culture"
subheading) (last visited July 15, 2009) [hereinafter Denson].
58. John H. Peterson, Jr., Choctaw Self-Determination in the 1980s, in INDIANS OF THE
SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES IN THE LATE 20TH CENTURY 141 (J. Anthony Paredas ed.,
1992).
59. Denson, supra note 57.
60. Peterson, supra note 58, at 160. The selection of sports has also been influenced by
contact, as more Choctaw play softball than stickball. Id.
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and children.6' In arriving at this model, matrilineal descent was weakened as
inheritance began to be reckoned patrilineally.6 2 The clan structure gave way
to a territorial structure that did not rely on the clan to organize social or
political life.63 The role of a father in raising his children has increased with
a corresponding decrease in his role in raising his sister's children.' Simply
put, the Choctaw social structure has shifted from a pre-contact model based
on matrilineage to a patrilineal or generational model that more closely
resembles the Anglo-European family model.65
It is important to note that remnants of the traditional structure are still
present, giving testimony to the Choctaws' cultural heritage and unwillingness
to be assimilated.66 For instance, the clan continues to support the social
structure, albeit in different form.67 Although Choctaw families follow a
nuclear family model, families in the communities are held together by
extended kinship, "which is basically congruent with the clan."'6
Consequently, "[t]he clan thus holds the local group together, rather than tying
together different communities as it did in the past. '
Nevertheless, Choctaw social and kinship structure has changed since its
pre-contact model. One reason for that change is the influence of U.S. law
imposed on the Choctaw without respect to the tribe's culture, values, or
beliefs. To understand why that change occurred, we must consider the laws
that changed a culture, starting with the first contact of Europeans with the
Choctaw.
61. MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 189.
62. See id. at 73.
63. See id.; EGGAN, supra note 28, at 29.
64. MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 73.
65. NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN ANTHROPOLOGY: ESSAYS ON SOcIETY AND CULTURE 8
(Raymond J. DeMallie & Alfonso Ortiz eds., 1994).
66. Indeed, the history of contact between the Choctaw and Euro-Americans altered-but
did not destroy-the Choctaw kinship and social structure. Peterson, supra note 58, at 160.
Further, Choctaw culture continues in the form of language, dress, dance, and various social
activities. Denson, supra note 57. Most Choctaw continue to speak Choctaw at home and "the
traditional Choctaw identity based on kinship groups, individual Choctaw communities, and the
Choctaws as a language group is continuing." Peterson, supra note 58, at 160.
67. Denson, supra note 57.
68. MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 189.
69. Id. at 189-90.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
II. Laws that Changed a Culture
Spanish conquistador Hernando de Soto was the first European to encounter
the ancestors of the people later known to Europeans as Choctaw.70 In 1539,
de Soto arrived on Florida's western coast in search of treasure and gold.7 As
he traveled into the southeast region of North America, he entered the
Mississippi River region and encountered many sovereign Indian nations.72
This initial contact was somewhat limited--de Soto soon died of a fever and
his body was thrown into the Mississippi-yet it likely allowed for the
introduction of new diseases that affected the Choctaw population.73 De
Soto's foray into the Mississippi region foreshadowed a more sustained period
of contact with Europeans-and their laws-that would dramatically change
Choctaw culture.
A. Contact and Removal
The next period of contact occurred at the end of the seventeenth century
when representatives of French and English colonial governments entered the
Mississippi region.74 From this contact, trade relationships were developed in
which Choctaws traded deerskins for European goods. 75 Eventually a split
occurred between those villages that traded with the English and those that
traded with the French.76 Although the French traders won the initial dispute,
the Treaty of Paris in 1763 gave the English control over trade with Southeast
tribes.77 American colonists increasingly moved into the area, establishing
70. Kidwell, supra note 32, at 119.
71. ALvINM. JOSEPHY, JR., 500 NATIONS: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OFNORTH AMERICAN
INDiANS 141 (1994).
72. See id.
73. Kidwell, supra note 32, at 119.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id. ("These trade relationships and attempts by colonial agents to secure military
alliances with the Choctaws ultimately led to a division within the tribe of those villages that
traded with the French and those that traded with the English.").
77. In the late 1700s, the Spanish still controlled portions of the southeast in Florida as well
as all the lands west of the Mississippi River. Id. The Choctaws signed treaties with both the
Spanish government and with the newly established U.S. government, many of which
guaranteed their right to "remain on their land and to hold lands in common." ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 32, at 646. In 1801, France bought the Louisiana
Territory from Spain, later selling it to the United States in 1803. Kidwell, supra note 32, at
120. The Louisiana Purchase effectively isolated the Choctaw from their Spanish allies. Id.
To further ensure that Spain was cut off from any allies in the U.S. territory, the United States
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trading posts and raising cattle.78 The increased contact also resulted in
intermarriage between the Europeans and the Choctaw.79 These unions
produced many mixed-blood children who would later have a profound impact
on the future of the tribe by serving as intermediaries between the two
cultures."
After the American Revolutionary War, the United States gave tacit
recognition to the rights of tribes to self-government by entering into treaties
with the Indians as distinct political communities.8 The Treaty of Hopewell,
signed in 1786, was the first treaty between the Choctaw and the United
States.8 That treaty established "perpetual peace and friendship" and gave the
government the right to establish three trading posts within Choctaw
territory.83 It also fixed the boundaries of native land and withdrew federal
protection over any Europeans on tribal lands, purportedly to discourage
European settlement on tribal lands.'
By the early nineteenth century, the Choctaws-along with the Creek,
Chickasaw, Cherokee, and Seminole tribes-had come to be considered one
of the "Five Civilized Tribes. ' '85 This distinction was given to those tribes that
had adopted Anglo-American household, farming, and governing patterns,86
including adopting written constitutions, statutes, and courts.8 7 The Choctaw
took these steps because they believed their survival depended both on
negotiated a treaty with the Choctaws to acquire land held by the Choctaw along the border of
Spanish-held land in Florida. Id. In 1805, the Choctaws ceded this land to the United States.
Id.
78. Kidwell, supra note 32, at 119-20.
79. Id. at 119-20 ("They [American settlers] married Choctaw women and produced mixed-
blood families. They also introduced domesticated cattle and established trading posts that
attracted other white men into Choctaw country.").
80. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18, at 90.
81. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 593-94 (1823) (noting that "[t]hese
[Indian] nations had been at war with the United States, and had an unquestionable right to
annul any grant they had made to American citizens"); DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18, at 3;
Phillip M. Kannan, Reinstating Treaty-Making with Native American Tribes, 16 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 809, 813-14 (2008).
82. MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 37.
83. DEBO, supra note 35, at 32.
84. Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1785, in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY 6-7 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 1990).
85. See Carla D. Pratt, Tribes and Tribulations: Beyond Sovereign Immunity and Toward
Reparation and Reconciliation for the Estelusti, 11 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY
L.J. 61, 75 (2005).
86. KEHOE, supra note 1, at 201.
87. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 32, at 201.
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peaceful relationships with Anglo-Americans and on the adoption of Anglo
lifeways8s
Despite their designation as a "Civilized Tribe," President Andrew Jackson
sought to remove the Choctaws living on the eastern side of the Mississippi to
the West. 9 It was believed that American Indians would better assimilate to
European/American ways of life if they were secluded on reservations.90
At the urging of the State of Mississippi, the United States negotiated the
Treaty of Doak's Stand.9 In that treaty, the Choctaws agreed to cede their
land east of the Mississippi in exchange for thirteen million acres of land in
Oklahoma.92 The remaining Choctaw land in Mississippi was to stay under
Choctaw control until the Choctaw were to "become so civilized and
enlightened to be made citizens of the United States. '93 The tribe was to be
provided with schools,'" a police force, and individual pensions for its
inhabitants.95 Due to the presence of European settlers in the promised
territory, this treaty was not finalized until 1825. By that time, the Choctaw
had a government based on a constitution of their own design, a court system,
and their own police force.'
Although the Doak's Treaty promised that the Choctaw would remain in
control of their land, Mississippi passed several laws that conferred state
citizenship to the Choctaw and placed Choctaw lands under state authority.97
88. JOSEPHY,supra note 71, at 320.
89. KEHOE, supra note 1, at 189; ENCYCLOPEDIAOFNORTHAMERICAN INDIANS,supra note
32, at 201.
90. KEHOE, supra note 1, at 186-87.
91. Treaty with the Choctaw, Oct. 18, 1820,7 Stat. 210; see MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra
note 27, at 57; see also United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 639 (1978) (discussing Treaty of
Doak's Stand).
92. Treaty with the Choctaw, supra note 91, at arts. 1-2; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 32, at 120.
93. Treaty with the Choctaw, supra note 91, at art. 4.
94. In 1816, the Choctaw ceded a parcel of land to the United States, the proceeds of which
went to establish schools for Choctaw children. Kidwell, supra note 32, at 120; see MCKEE &
SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 52 (listing land cessions and acquisitions). The Choctaw opened
their first school in 1824 in Blue Springs, Kentucky, followed by twelve local schools in 1838
and a series of boarding schools established in 1842. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERICAN
INDIANS, supra note 32, at 202. Choctaw leaders believed the new schools would enhance the
tribe's ability to deal with the government as well as white settlers in the surrounding territory.
Kidwell, supra note 32, at 120. In contrast, the government viewed the schools as a tool to
assimilate Choctaw children into European culture. Id.
95. Treaty with the Choctaw, supra note 91, at art. 8.
96. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 32, at 646.
97. MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 68; see Treaty with the Choctaw, supra note
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Further, Mississippi dissolved the Choctaw Nation's government and set
penalties for anyone presuming to serve as a tribal official.9" The Choctaw
appealed, believing the United States would uphold its treaty obligations."
President Andrew Jackson, who was committed to removing all southeastern
native peoples to west of the Mississippi River, rebuffed their pleas.' ° What
followed was a campaign to rid this territory of its native people.''
Congress passed the Removal Act'02 on May 28, 1830. Signed by President
Jackson, the Act authorized Jackson to negotiate treaties with the tribes.1
3
Under the treaties, the tribes would exchange their lands east of the Mississippi
for unclaimed lands in the West." Ultimately, the Removal Act forced
Indians in the East to move to the western territories, culminating in the
infamous Trail of Tears. 0 5
Under the 1830 Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, the Choctaw agreed to
cede their Alabama and Mississippi land and to relocate to Oklahoma."° In
return, the United States agreed to pay the cost of removal, including
providing the Choctaw with the means of removal (including food and
transportation) to Oklahoma, provisions once they arrived in their new home,
and an annuity of $20,000 for twenty years.'0 7
The Choctaws were the first tribe to go on the Trail of Tears, 08 most
traveling during the winter of 1831 to 1832.'° Although the government spent
more than $5 million on the removal, this sum was not reflected in the
conditions the Choctaws endured."" Due to inadequate planning, corruption
on the part of contractors, disease, and bad weather, the removal period was
91, at art. 9.
98. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 32, at 646.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Kidwell, supra note 32, at 120.
102. Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 174 (2006)).
103. See id. § 2, 4 Stat. at 412. For removal routes, see MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note
27, at 79.
104. See id. § 1,4Stat. at411-12.
105. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18, at 6-8 (discussing removal).
106. Treaty with the Choctaw arts. 2,3, Sept. 16, 1830,7 Stat. 333; JOSEPHY,supra note 71,
at 326; Kidwell, supra note 32, at 121.
107. Treaty with the Choctaw, supra note 106, at arts. 16, 17; DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 84, at 56.
108. In fact, it was the Choctaw's experience that resulted in the removal being named the
"Trail of Tears." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 32, at 639.
109. KEHOE, supra note 1, at 200-01.
110. Id. at 188.
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disastrous for those people forced to Oklahoma."' In the four years it took to
complete the removal, approximately twenty-five percent of the Choctaw died,
predominately from hunger, disease, accidents, and exposure." 2 Once the tribe
arrived in Oklahoma, it faced further hardships such as inadequate supplies of
food and medicine."
3
The removal period signifies the greatest change to the Choctaw kinship
system. Although the majority of Choctaw relocated to Oklahoma, several
thousand evaded removal and remained in Mississippi." 4 Indeed, the many
lives that were lost on the Trail of Tears and the conditions suffered by the
Choctaw only deepened the resolve of those still in Mississippi not to be
removed."' Thus, the tribe was now geographically divided into two
communities, the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma and the Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians, each with separate governments." 6
Under the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, those Choctaw who remained
in Mississippi were to register with a government agent for an allotment of
land, for which they were to receive title."7 Despite this provision, the
111. Id.
112. JOSEPHY,supra note 71, at 326.
113. Kidwell, supra note 32, at 121. Despite such hardships, the Choctaw were able to
establish a community in the West, including a tribal government. Id. The Choctaw were the
first to produce a written constitution to be adopted in Oklahoma. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 32, at 202.
114. MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 64, 145. In 1907, when Oklahoma became
part of the United States, the Oklahoma Choctaw lost their right to govern themselves. Kidwell,
supra note 32, at 121. The Mississippi Choctaw were also impacted by the shift of Oklahoma
from the Indian Territory to a state in the early 1900s. Peterson, supra note 58, at 141. In
preparation for this event, the Dawes Commission, established in 1893, began efforts to bring
the tribe into conformity with the Act. Id. The Commission sought to induce those Choctaws
still living in Mississippi to move to Oklahoma by allowing them to participate in the land-
allocation agreement under the same terms as the Oklahoma Choctaw. Id. The resulting
migration of entire communities of Choctaw-who sold their churches and moved as a
group-completely disrupted Choctaw society in Mississippi and Oklahoma. Id. Arriving in
Oklahoma, many did not receive their land as promised or were unable to keep the land they
did receive. Id. Therefore many returned to Mississippi. Id. For those Choctaw who had
chosen to remain in Mississippi, their communities were decimated by the disruption. Id.
Indeed, those who returned faced communities in which many of their churches and schools had
been abandoned. Id. A 1917 influenza epidemic further damaged the community. Id.
115. KEHOE, supra note 1, at 188.
116. See MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 157 ("The traditional Choctaw social
organization had become modified tremendously as the Choctaws separated into two distinct
units, one in Mississippi and the other in Oklahoma."); Kidwell, supra note 32, at 121.
117. Treaty with the Choctaw, supra note 106, at arts. 13, 14; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 32, at 121.
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Mississippi Choctaw were subjected to repeated attempts to persuade them to
leave their land and move west."8 Indeed, such removal efforts continued
until the 1850s." 9 Moreover, while many Choctaws attempted to register as
required, very few actually received their land titles.'20 Instead, they became
squatters on marginal land that was often owned by investors residing in other
states.
12 1
More changes came as the tribe increasingly came under the control of the
U.S. legal system. Indeed, the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek stipulated the
circumstances in which U.S. law extended over Choctaw territory.
122
Although the treaty granted the Choctaw the "jurisdiction and government of
all the persons and property. . . within their territory," it also brought them
under the authority of U.S. laws, by stipulating that criminal offenses
perpetrated by Choctaw against non-Choctaw were to be tried under the
jurisdiction and laws of the United States.2 3 These changes in legal structures
affected Oklahoma Choctaw kinship systems. For instance, once tribal courts,
instead of the deceased's clan, became responsible for punishing murder, clan
membership became less important than tribal membership, and the role of the
moiety declined.2 4
While the major changes appear to have occurred after the Choctaws'
forced migration to the West, some changes most likely occurred earlier. For
instance, even before the 1831 removal, Christian missionaries migrating into
the Choctaw region had begun to influence the Choctaw kinship system,
particularly its matrilineal basis.2 5 While the clan-based system did continue,
the traditional matrilineal system was under increasing pressure to change. 1
26
For instance, missionaries promoted the notion that men, rather than women,
were the head of the family. 27  They also instigated the use of English
118. Peterson, supra note 58, at 141; MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 76, 157.
119. Peterson, supra note 58, at 140.
120. Kidwell, supra note 32, at 121; MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 76.
121. Peterson, supra note 58, at 140.
122. See Treaty with the Choctaw, supra note 106, at arts. 4-10.
123. See id. at arts. 4, 6; DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 84, at
54.
124. SPOEHR, supra note 33, at 209.
125. MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 65-66 ("The early missionaries, who were
particularly concerned about the fact that under the matrilineal system of inheritance the women
worked in the fields and the father was not responsible for his children, introduced the idea that
the man should be the head of the family.").
126. Id. at 66, 73 ("[T]he push was on for a change from a matrilineal to a patrilineal
society.").
127. Id. at 73.
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names.'28 New schools were developed, which the United States hoped would
help assimilate Choctaw children into Anglo culture.'29 Consequently, fathers
increasingly became responsible for their children's education, taking over the
traditional role of the mother's brother. 3° Nevertheless, the tribe's traditional
kinship system was still being practiced by the Choctaw until the removal
period.' 3
1
Further, as more and more Europeans migrated into the Choctaw territory
in the eighteenth century, they began to intermarry with Choctaws.'32 The
increase in intermarriage eroded the clan-based social system by disrupting the
pre-contact system of family relationships and reducing the importance of the
clan in social organization and selection of tribal leaders. 33 By the end of the
eighteenth century, the traditional clan system was being eroded; it was during
this time period that the moieties of the pre-contact period disappeared.' 34
Mixed-blood offspring also affected the political structure of the tribe. In
the early 1800s a struggle for the leadership of the tribe occurred between a
mixed-blood Choctaw, David Folsom, and a full-blooded Choctaw chief,
Mushulatubbee. 35 Leadership was eventually passed to Greenwood LeFlore,
a mixed-blood Choctaw.'36 A supporter of Christian missionaries and
education, LeFlore instituted a number of changes to the political traditions of
the Choctaw.'37 Under his leadership, the Tribal Council adopted a written
constitution and an elected, representative government.'38 Most dramatic was
the change in the form of government: LeFlore became sole leader of the tribe,
replacing the traditional leadership pattern of a three-member chief council.'39
128. Id.
129. Kidwell, supra note 32, at 120.
130. See MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 73 ("Parents also began to acquire more
control over the rearing and education of the children, whereas the maternal uncle had assumed
this responsibility in the past.").
131. EGGAN, supra note 28, at 31.
132. MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 48.
133. A.M. Gibson, The Indians of Mississippi, in A HISTORY OF Mississippi 69, 79-80
(Richard Aubrey McLemore ed., 1973).
134. MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 47.
135. Kidwell, supra note 32, at 120 ("A power struggle broke out in the northeast district
of the tribe between David Folsom, son of a Scotch Irish father and a Choctaw mother, and
Mushulatubbee, the last of the full-blood chiefs of the tribe.").
136. Kidwell, supra note 32, at 120.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 61; Kidwell, supra note 32, at 120.
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Moreover, it was in the midst of the disruption these changes engendered
that the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek was signed, in which the Choctaw
agreed to relocate to Oklahoma.'" While it is true that this removal period
represented "the most dramatic and dynamic [event] in Choctaw cultural and
social history,"'14 1 it does not completely explain the dramatic change to
Choctaw social structure found by anthropologist Fred Eggan in his study of
the Five Civilized Tribes. Rather, the continued imposition of U.S. law on the
Choctaw culture further altered the tribe's kinship and social structure.
B. Allotment and the End of Treaty Making
It was not just simply the disruption of removal and the geographic division
of the tribe that brought about the changes to the Choctaw social structure.
Rather, U.S. laws-imposed from without-caused further changes by seeking
to end tribal practices such as holding land in common and matrilineal
inheritance.
In 1871, Congress suspended treaty making between the United States and
the various tribes.'42 While treaty making had not always benefitted the tribes,
it did at least recognize the tribes' right to some measure of input in their own
governance by tacitly recognizing the tribes' authority to negotiate treaty terms
that would govern U.S.-tribal relations. In contrast, under the new
congressional policy, "no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation,
tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty."'
' 43
Consequently, Congress began to deal with tribes only by passing legislation,
with or without tribal input. 44
140. Kidwell, supra note 32, at 121 (explaining that Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek
provided that Choctaw who did not wish to relocate could remain in Mississippi provided they
registered with a government agent for an allotment of land and received title to the land; they
would be deemed citizens of Mississippi); KEHOE, supra note 1, at 201.
141. McKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 145.
142. Indian Appropriation Act, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 545 (1871); see also Antoine v.
Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203 (1975) (explaining that after 1871 Act, relations between
Indians and Congress would be governed by statutes, not treaties, and that the Act did not affect
Congress's plenary power over tribes).
143. Indian Appropriation Act, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871); see also Note, Tribal
Property Interests in Executive-Order Reservations: A Compensable Indian Right, 69 YALE L.J.
627, 628-29 (1960) (noting that after end of treaty making period, reservations were created by
executive order until 1919, when Congress prohibited any further executive-order reservations).
144. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18, at 5. This change was somewhat cosmetic: Treaty-
making still continued until 1914, although these treaties "had to be called 'agreements' when
being presented [to Congress] for ratification." Id.
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In keeping with this new policy, Congress next sought to end the tribal
practice of holding land in common. In 1887, Congress passed the General
Allotment Act.'45 Also known as the Dawes Act, it divided communally held
lands into individual allotments and gave individuals title to a portion of the
land as private property. 146  This pattern of land holding was more in
conformity with European and U.S. legal traditions and their emphasis on
individual rights. 4 7 However, the Act excluded the Choctaw (as well as the
other Five Civilized Tribes) from its provisions, and the Choctaw continued
communal ownership for a time.
48
To address this inconsistency, Congress authorized a commission to
negotiate with each of these tribes to bring them into conformity with the
allotment policy. 49 The commission hoped to encourage the tribes to abandon
self-government and to induce the Mississippi Choctaw to relocate to
Oklahoma. 50 A decade after the Dawes Act, the Atoka Agreement was signed
providing for allotment of the Choctaw land.'5
The purpose of allotment was to consciously destroy tribalism and to
assimilate American Indians by urging them to learn "proper" business
practices and farming.' It was also designed to eliminate the tradition of
145. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 288 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-
334, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 354, 381 (2006)), repealed by Indian Land Consolidation Act
Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-462 § 106(a)(1), 114 Stat. 2007 (2000).
146. See 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2006).
147. See id. A further problem with the Act is that it provided that allotments were to pass
by will, but Indians were deemed incompetent to create wills. Douglas Nash & Cecelia Burke,
Passing Title to Tribal Lands: Existing Federal and Emerging Tribal Probate Codes,
ADVOCATE,May 2007, at 26,26, available athttp://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/advocate/adv07may.pdf.
148. Yuanchung Lee, Rediscovering the Constitutional Lineage of Federal Indian Law, 27
N.M. L. REv. 273, 293 & n.143 (1997); see also RoY GITrINGER, THE FORMATION OF THE
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 1803-1906, at 169 (1917) ("[The Dawes Act] was drawn so that it did
not apply to... the Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes. These latter were the most advanced
and most nearly ready of all for such a policy but they were known to be bitterly opposed to any
change in their organization.").
149. McKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 93 (describing purpose of Dawes Act as
"encourag[ing] the abandonment of Indian self-government among the Five Civilized Tribes
in Oklahoma in order to clear the way for Oklahoma statehood").
150. Id. at95.
151. The Curtis Act established the manner in which the lands of the Oklahoma Choctaw
were to be divided and the eligibility for tribal membership and allotment. Curtis Act, ch. 517,
30 Stat. 495 (1898); MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 95. The Atoka Agreement was
incorporated into the Curtis Act. 30 Stat. at 495-96; see also Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665,
668 (1912).
152. Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799, 846-47
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holding land in common.'53 It was hoped that allotment would "solve the
problems of the Indians in one generation," as the effect of ownership of
private property would impel the native person into a "'civilized' state.' 54
This assimilation was to take place within the twenty-five year period set by
the Dawes Act.'1 After an allotee demonstrated his capacity to fulfill the
Act's assimilationist goals, the title to the land would be given to him.5 6 Once
this occurred, the allotted land lost its status as "Indian land" and, thus, could
be bought or sold without the restrictions of the Trade and Intercourse Act.
157
Further, the allottee would become a citizen and would come under the
jurisdiction of the state in which the allottee resided.' In situations where
allottees refused to work their allotments, government agents were instructed
to withhold rations and annuities provided for in the Act.
159
For the Choctaw, the allotment period further eroded the matrilineal kinship
system by emphasizing the Anglo model of marriage and inheritance. "
(2007); see 25 U.S.C. § 331 (2006), repealed by Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments
of 2000, Pub. L. 106-462, Title I, § 106(a)(l), 114 Stat. 2007 (2000).
153. Marian E. Saksena, Out-of-Home Placements for Abused, Neglected, and Dependent
Children in Minnesota: A Historical Perspective, 32 WM. MITcHELL L. REV. 1007, 1035
(2006).
154. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18, at 9; see also Cobell v. Norton, 283 F. Supp. 2d
66, 75 (D.D.C. 2003) ("[A] key assumption of the government's allotment policy was that
'Indians wanted to become farmers and had the capacity to do so. This policy assumed that the
routine work of agriculture would provide the necessary training in thrifty habits that all
'civilized' people possessed."') (quoting DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18, at 9-10).
155. Dawes Act § 5, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388,389-90 (1887); see Cobell, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 74-
75 ("They were so confident in this assimilation policy that there was actually a sunset in most
of the allotment agreements that said after 25 years the trust patents will be withdrawn, you'll
be issued a fee patent, each individual who owned this land, and you will go forth and prosper.
You will own the land outright, and may do with it what you wish."); History ofthe Allotment
Policy: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 428-85
(1934) (statement of Delos Sacket Otis), reprinted in DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 166 (5th ed. 2005); DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18,
at 9. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 24, at 8 1.
156. Dawes Act §§ 5-6, 24 Stat. at 389-90; see DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18, at 9; see
also Cobell, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 75.
157. Dawes Act § 5,24 Stat. at 389-90; Jennifer R. Sunderlin, Note, OneNation, Indivisible:
American "Indian Country'" in the Wake of City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 70 ALB.
L. REV. 1563, 1575 (2007). The Trade and Intercourse Act prohibited the sale or purchase of
tribal lands without congressional approval. Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137,
138 (1790) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006)).
158. Dawes Act § 6, 24 Stat. at 389-90; DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18, at 9.
159. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18, at 10.
160. See 25 U.S.C. § 333 (2006).
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Unlike the matrilineal Choctaw, U.S. laws echoed the patrilineal-focused
ideology promoted by Christian missionaries 6' by emphasizing patrilineal
descent in inheritance.'62 Specifically, the Dawes Act divided reservation land
into parcels to be distributed to tribal members.'63 The act spelled out a
formula for this distribution, one in which "each head of a family" was given
one-quarter section; orphans under age eighteen and each single person over
eighteen years of age was given one-eighth of a section; and children under
eighteen were given one-sixteenth of a section."
Inheritance of the land was to be based on the laws of descent and
inheritance in the state or territory in which the land was located.'65 For
instance, under the General Allotment Act, Kansas's laws regulating
descent-not the traditions of the tribes-were to apply to Indian Territory
66
lands allotted under the Act. 6 Although the Dawes Act did not apply to the
Choctaw, its provisions were considered to apply to land allotted under
specific provisions applying to the tribe. ~ Because the Choctaw's traditional
system did not convey property according to the European patrilineal model,
that system had to adapt to the Act's constraints.
To bring the Choctaw into conformity with European values, "new
regulations regarding the land were introduced that emphasized the position
161. See supra text accompanying notes 125-31.
162. McKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 142.
163. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (repealed by Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-462, 114 Stat. 1991); see also GITTNGER, supra note 148, at 169-70; AFTER
REMOVAL: THE CHOCTAW IN MississIPI 85 (Samuel J. Wells & Roseanna Tubby eds., 1986).
164. Cobell v. Norton, 283 F. Supp. 2d 66, 74 (D.D.C. 2003).
165. 25 U.S.C. § 348; Jefferson v. Fink, 247 U.S. 288,290 (1918). Initially, allotments to
individuals permitted descent according to tribal tradition. Id. However, this approach was
later rejected in favor of following state law. Id. The Supreme Court explained that this change
was warranted "because the tribal laws and usages were generally crude and often difficult of
ascertainment." Id. Presumably, following the vagaries of state laws of inheritance was equally
as difficult for the tribes.
166. "Indian Territory" later became the State of Oklahoma. Paul Spruhan, A Legal History
of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REv. 1, 10 n.66 (2006). See
generally RoY GrTTINGER, THE FORMATION OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 1803-1906 (1939).
167. See Peoria Tribe Band of Indians v. Wea Townsite Co., 117 F.2d 940, 942 (10th Cir.
1941) ("The General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 348, provided that the laws of the state of
Kansas regulating descent should apply to all lands in the Indian Territory allotted under the
provisions thereof."); see also Peter Nicholas, American Style Justice in No Man 's Land, GA.
L. REv. 895, 1050-51 (2002).
168. See Jefferson, 247 U.S. at 290 ("True, that act has no direct application to the lands of
the Five Civilized Tribes .... but it does throw much light on what was intended by the
subsequent legislation relating to the descent of those lands when allotted.")
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of the man as head of the family. Marriage was regulated by law, widows
were entitled to dower rights, and children could inherit their father's
estate."' 69 While the law respected native marriage customs by conferring
"legitimacy" on their offspring, it established a patrilineal model by asserting
that the offspring were to be considered descendants of their father. 70 This
model was at odds with Choctaw practice, in which kin was traced through the
mother's lineage, and the mother's brother was responsible for the welfare of
his sister's children.' 71
The emphasis on the father's lineage in inheritance strengthened the
relationship between a father and his children. Consequently, the relationship
between a mother and her children was weakened, as was the relationship
between her children and her brother. 72 As the responsibilities traditionally
associated with mother's brother were taken over by her children's father, the
role of mother's brother in the matrilineage was diminished. 73 For instance,
the emphasis on patrilineal inheritance eliminated a brother's importance in
supporting his sister's children, while a reliance on mission schools diminished
his importance in educating and in transmitting the tribe's culture to these
children. 174 Instead, his support and educational responsibility shifted to his
patrilineal offspring, and the importance of the matrilineage declined. 175
Since matrilineage formed the basis of the clan system, the change to a
patrilineal model also impacted the importance of the clan in the Choctaw
social and political structure. 76 As inheritance came to be reckoned through
the father, the traditional Choctaw matrilineal descent was weakened. '77 This
change to a patrilineal inheritance transformed the clan structure into a
territorial structure. 78  Selections of chiefs were no longer based on
inheritance, but instead leaders were elected by the adult males of the
community.
179
Allotment also changed the face of Choctaw communities. After the Civil
War, the Choctaw emerged as sharecroppers on their former lands, "sustaining
169. EcGAN, supra note 28, at 29.
170. 25 U.S.C. § 371.
171. See MCKEE & SCHLENK , supra note 27, at 29.
172. Id. at 73.
173. Eggan, supra note 31, at 34, 50.
174. MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 100.
175. EGGAN, supra note 28, at 29.
176. See id.
177. See MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 73.
178. Id.
179. EGGAN, supra note 28, at 29.
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their communities through traditional stickball games, funeral ceremonies, and
attendance at church ceremonies, where Choctaw ministers preached in their
language and where they could sing their hymns in Choctaw."' 80 In addition,
the rural Christian church emerged as an important component of the Choctaw
community in the 1880s, and by the 1890s schools were established, most of
which were housed in church buildings.' The education of Choctaw children
shifted from the extended family to church-based schools.'82 As their
communities came to be centered on churches and schools, the Choctaw
community came to resemble the community patterns of other Anglo rural
groups in the area.8 3 Moreover, as the importance of the church rose, its
activities replaced traditional rituals."
C. The End ofAllotment and Self-Determination
The allotment period ended in 1934 when Congress passed the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA). 5 In addition to ending the allotment of tribal
lands, the Act allowed the tribes to adopt their own constitutions and
bylaws-which had to be submitted for federal approval-and to form tribal
governments.8 6 The expectation was that the tribal government would take
over governance of the tribe, performing duties previously performed by the
federal Bureau of Indian Affairs.' 87 Although the Act contained many
provisions for tribal self-governance, the new constitutions were based on a
U.S. model of democracy that did not take into account traditional cultural
methods. 88 Further, the organization of tribal governments was subject to the
180. Kidwell, supra note 32, at 121.
181. Peterson, supra note 58, at 140.
182. See id. at 140-41 ("By the 1880s the rural church was emerging as an important
institution in the Choctaw communities... by the 1890s schools were established in most
Choctaw communities .. . as rural communities centered around their own churches and
schools.").
183. Id. at 141.
184. EGGAN, supra note 28, at 29.
185. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2006)).
186. 25 U.S.C. § 476(b).
187. See Id. § 476.
188. See id.; DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18, at 5 ("Familiar cultural groupings and
methods of choosing leadership gave way to the more abstract principles of American
democracy, which [view] people as interchangeable and communities as geographical marks
on a map.... Although there were some variations, in general the new tribal constitutions and
bylaws were standardized and largely followed the Anglo-American system of organizing
people.").
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approval of the U.S. Secretary of the Interior.'89
Many tribes resented the continued federal involvement in their local
government and others challenged the Act's imposition of an Anglo-American
governing model on the tribes at the expense of their traditional practices."
Indeed, the new constitutions drafted in compliance with the IRA were, for
many tribes, an unrecognizable form of government. 9 ' Rather than reliance
on kin and geography, the new constitutions were based on abstract principles
of democracy preferred by Anglo-Americans. 9 2 Further exacerbating the
problem was that-after the disruption instigated by the allotment
policies-many of the tribes had no experience with self-government
according to their own traditions.'93
Although others opposed it, the Mississippi Choctaw supported IRA's
passage. 94 In 1945, the tribe was recognized as a tribal nation. 9 With this
recognition, the tribe reestablished its government and created a written
constitution and bylaws, which were approved by the U.S. Secretary of the
Interior on May 22, 1945.196 Under this constitution, the tribal government
was comprised of a sixteen-member Tribal Council, representing each of the
seven communities, and an elected chief. 7 In the 1960s, the tribe took steps
toward self-determination with programs aimed at increasing economic
development, adult education and job training, tribal law enforcement, as well
as building coalitions with neighboring tribes to advocate on behalf of tribal
interests.198 Judicial recognition of the Mississippi Choctaw came in 1978.'99
189. 25 U.S.C. § 476(a)(2).
190. DELORIA& LYTLE, supra note 18, at 15; see also Julie Ann Fishel, United States Called
to Task on Indigenous Rights: The Western Shoshone Struggle and Success at the International
Level, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 619, 638 (2006-2007).
191. DELORIA& LYTLE, supra note 18, at 15.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 645 (1978).
195. Miss. Band ofChoctaw Indians, Historical Choctaw Timeline, http://www.choctaw.org
(follow "Historic Timeline" hyperlink under the "History" subheading) (last visited July 21,
2009).
196. See John, 437 U.S. at 645; Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, Choctaw Chronology Part
V: 1918-1962, http://www.choctaw.org/History/Chronology/chronology5.html (last visited July
21, 2009).
197. Miss. BAND OF CHOCTAW IND1ANs TRiBALCONST. art. 4, § 2, available at http://www.
choctaw.org (follow "Documents of Governance" hyperlink under "Government" subhead).
198. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, Choctaw Chronology Part VI: 1963-Present, http://
www.choctaw.org/History/Chronology/chronology6.html (last visited July 21, 2009). More
specifically, the programs involved the creation of the Choctaw Community Action Agency to
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
Unfortunately, the promise the Choctaw saw in the IRA had little time to
fulfill itself.2" United States involvement in World War II meant a restriction
of budgets during and after the conflict.20' Consequently, the United States
sought to cut its expenditures.2"2 Further, it sought to rid itself of race laws
that, in the aftermath of World War H, were considered too restrictive.2 3 From
these dual efforts a new attitude toward Anglo-Native relations appeared, one
which called for termination of federal assistance to native tribes.2' The
termination period, which began in 1953, was designed to end the federal-
tribal relationship. Instead, the United States sought to destroy tribes as
separate political entities by abolishing tribal reservations and tribal rights,
thereby scattering individual tribal members in an effort to assimilate them
into broader society.20 5 Ultimately, more than one hundred tribes were
terminated or stripped of their federally recognized tribal status.2°
While many tribes welcomed the idea of self-government, they did not want
an end to the status of tribes as separate legal entities, and most viewed the
termination actions of Congress as detrimental. 27 However, American Indians
did accrue some benefits during the termination period. For instance, the same
Congress that passed Resolution 108 included reservation land in the newly
created federal education programs of 1950 that targeted federal money for
school construction and other assistance programs. 0 8 Somewhat contrary to
construct houses, utilities, and offices and the Choctaw Housing Authority to construct and
renovate reservation housing. Id. The tribe also organized the Chahta Development Company,
which provided employment and job training for its members through government and private
construction contracts. Id.
199. John, 437 U.S. at 645; see also AFrER REMOVAL: THE CHOCTAW IN MISSISSIPPI, supra
note 163, at 24-25.
200. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18, at 15.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 17.
204. Id. at 16.
205. See H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B 132 (1953); Nicole E. Ducheneaux, Note,
Smith v. Salish Kootenai College: Self-Determination As Governing Principle Or Afterthought
In Tribal Civil Jurisdiction Jurisprudence?, 68 MONT. L. REV. 211, 214 (2007).
206. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18, at 18. The following year Congress passed
Public Law 280, which extended state civil and criminal jurisdiction in California, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin, over "offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas
of Indian country." Public Law 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(2006)).
207. AFTER REMOVAL: THE CHOCTAW IN MISSISSIPPI, supra note 163, at 125.
208. DELORIA& LYTLE, supra note 18, at 19.
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Congress's stated aim of reducing federal involvement in American Indian
affairs, the government became increasingly involved in Indian education."
The Choctaw had mixed success during the termination period. Though the
tribe was not terminated, voluntary removal of Choctaw from Mississippi was
taking place in the 1960s in response to the poor economic and educational
conditions of the tribe.21 ° At that time, more than half the population lived on
trust land; one-third of the heads of households were unemployed, and one-
third worked as temporary day laborers.' A high school for Choctaw teens
was not completed until 1964, and few Choctaw were educated enough to
compete for more than menial jobs. 2 ' Individual members of the tribe began
attempts at relocation, but most returned, unable to compete in the larger
marketplace. 1 3 The Bureau of Indian Affairs began a relocation training
program in the late 1960s in which ten percent of the tribe's population
enrolled.21 4 This program, paired with the unstructured relocation, meant that
close to one-third of the tribe's members were leaving the reservation area. 1 5
This pattern began to change in the late 1960s as the first students began to
graduate from the new high school.21 6 Especially important was the passage
of the federal Civil Rights Act, which opened up jobs to Choctaws that had
previously been denied them by segregation laws.2 7 Along with these
changes, the Choctaw government began a massive economic renewal
project. 18 As a result of this project, the Choctaw were able to provide a
variety of needed services to the community.21 9 As these improvements
developed, the tribal government started seeking a more active role.220
Ultimately, the tribal government established control of tribal operations and
209. See Peterson, supra note 58, at 143.
210. See id. ("It seemed as if a third Choctaw removal was underway, this time by individual
choice and economic necessity.").
211. Id.
212. Id. at 142.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 142-43.
215. Id. at 143.
216. Id.
217. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(i) (2000); see Peterson, supra note 58, at 143; Jennifer
Nutt Carleton, State Income Taxation ofNonmember Indians in Indian Country, 27 AM. INDIAN
L. REv. 253, 275 (2002-2003); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 545 (1974).
218. Peterson, supra note 58, at 144.
219. Id
220. Id.
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formed a consolidated tribal government that provided the majority of services
on the reservation.22'
In 1970, President Richard Nixon repudiated termination as "morally and
legally unacceptable" and asked Congress to enact a concurrent resolution to
"expressly renounce, repudiate and repeal the termination policy. ' 22 2 Congress
responded by passing several laws that attempted to incorporate native values
into laws concerning tribes.223 One of those laws was the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA).
III One Step Forward: The Indian Child Welfare Act
From initial contact until the time of ICWA's passage, U.S. policy toward
American Indians had stressed termination and assimilation. Laws concerning
American Indian tribes not only reflected that policy, but they also helped put
221. Id. at 146. Under control of the tribal government, the Choctaw have undergone a rapid
economic expansion. In 1979 the tribe began to focus on economic development. In the early
to mid-i 980s, this effort took the form of industrial production in which the tribe has "[built]
an industrial enterprise based on centralized financial strength of a tribal government and related
tribally owned enterprises." Id. at 157. Thirty years later, the Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians was one of the largest employers in the State of Mississippi. Deborah Boykin, Choctaw
Indians in the 21st Century, Miss. HiST. Now, http://mshistory.kl2.ms.us/articles/I0/choctaw-
indians-in-the-2 1st-century (last visited July 21, 2009).
222. H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, at 3 (1970). Twelve years earlier, the Secretary of the Interior
had announced that no federal tribe would be terminated without the Department's consent.
SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INDIAN EDUCATION, COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, INDIAN
EDUCATION: A NATIONAL TRAGEDY-A NATIONAL CHALLENGE, S. REP. No. 91-501, at 14
(1969); see also Daniel M. Rosenfelt, Indian Schools and Community Control, 25 STAN. L. REv.
489, 501 (1973). That announcement, however, was not a formal end to House Resolution 108,
which remained the official policy of Congress and continued to be cited by proponents of
termination during the 1960s. DELORIA &LYTLE, supra note 18, at 20. Despite the termination
policy, the decade saw the passage of a variety of laws considered beneficial to the tribes. For
example, in 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1303 (2006). This act created a model code to govern judicial proceedings conducted by tribal
courts, including extending federal constitutional protections to any individual tried for an
offense by a tribal court. Id. § 1311. In repudiation of Public Law 280, the Act also required
tribal consent be given before any state claimed jurisdiction over tribal civil or criminal
proceedings. See Id. § 1326. Nevertheless, the ICRA has also been viewed as another attempt
to fit tribal governance into an Anglo model.
223. See e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (ICWA); 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2000) (Indian Religious
Freedom Act of 1978). Other examples of this trend include the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act,
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006) (as amended); the Indian Education Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-318, 86 Stat. 235; and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,
25 U.S.C. § 450(a).
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it into practice as the United States began to apply laws designed by Euro-
Americans to American Indian tribes. The tribes were rarely, if ever,
consulted in the construction of such laws, despite the impact on their lives.
In the case of the Choctaw, changes in their traditional kinship
system--especially the change from a matrilineal to a patrilineal descent
pattern-aptly demonstrates the effect of these laws on their culture.224
At the time of ICWA's passage, however, Congress had begun to stress a
policy of self-determination and economic expansion regarding American
Indian tribes. Laws passed in that era incorporated this policy and afforded
American Indian tribes a greater level of involvement in the creation of laws
that concern them. Because it opened the way for tries to live by their own
cultural norms, ICWA has been described as "one of the few pro-Indian laws
ever passed." '225 Rather than focus on an Anglo model, ICWA emphasizes the
tribe's competency to make adoption decisions with respect to tribal children.
When Congress began hearings on ICWA, it gave the Choctaw an
opportunity to have input into legislation that would directly affect both the
tribe and its families. Mississippi Choctaw Chief Calvin Isaac used this
opportunity to testify to the impact U.S. policies have had on native tribes.
Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced
if our children, the only real means for the transmission of the tribal
heritage, are to be raised in non-Indian homes and denied exposure
to the ways of their People. Furthermore, these practices seriously
224. While this change can be seen as an adaptation, there is also reason to believe that this
was not necessarily complete acquiescence. Indeed, it is important to recognize that the culture
of the Mississippi Choctaw remains dynamic and distinct. Although the Choctaw have been
greatly affected-both politically and culturally-by their contact with Euro-Americans, the
survival of their culture is proof of their perseverance in the face of laws at odds with, or
ignorant of, their cultural traditions, values, and beliefs. The Choctaw continue to speak their
own language and to practice their own unique cultural traditions. While their culture continues
to change, the Choctaw "today are closer to establishing greater control over their own affairs
since removal and dissolution of their nation." MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 194.
For instance, although the Choctaw have adopted a nuclear family model, they have also shaped
this model to fit their particular culture by augmenting the nuclear family with an extended kin
network that holds the local community together in much the same way the clan system held
communities together before European contact. Id. at 189-90. Moreover, more recent Choctaw
history demonstrates that tribal sovereignty and self-determination is a pathway to tribal
success. See FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN 302-33 (1997)
(describing economic success of Choctaw as example of how and why self-determination is
critical to tribal survival).
225. Colman McCarthy, Reopening the Drain on Indians Legacy, WASH. POST, July 16,
1996, at B08.
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undercut the tribe's ability to continue as self-governing
communities. Probably in no area is it more important that tribal
sovereignty be respected than in an area as socially and culturally
determinative as family relationships.226
When viewed within the context of the effect U.S. law has had on Choctaw
kinship structures, it is understandable why ICWA is considered so important
to the survival of the tribe. Chief Isaac's testimony before Congress on the
importance of ICWA to the integrity of native tribes is echoed in the text of
ICWA and has been repeated in countless journal articles.
After four years of testimony and hearings, Congress passed ICWA in 1978,
declaring that U.S. policy was "to protect the best interests of Indian children
and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families."227
ICWA was to establish standards for the removal of Indian children that would
"reflect the unique values of Indian culture" and provide "assistance to Indian
tribes in the operation of child and family service programs."228
In passing ICWA, Congress was reacting to a long history of forced
removal of American Indian children from their families and tribes by non-
tribal public and private agencies.229 Beginning in 1869, the United States had
instituted a policy in which thousands of Indian children were removed from
their homes, families, and tribes and sent to boarding schools run by
missionaries and government officials.2 a° By 1887, more than two hundred
such schools had been established.' While in these boarding schools, Indian
children were given European names and forbidden to speak their own
language or to receive visits from their families.232 Their personal belongings
and clothes were taken from them, and they were barred from practicing their
226. Hearings on S.1214 Before the House of Representatives Subcomm on Indian Affairs
and Public Lands, 95th Cong. 190, 193 (1978) (statement of Chief Calvin Isaac). Chief Isaac
also made this statement at the Hearings Before the United States Select Comm. on Indian
Affairs on S. 1214, 95th Cong. 154-58 (1977).
227. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2006).
228. Id.
229. DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 84, at 294.
230. C. Eric Davis, Note, In Defense of the Indian Child Welfare Act in Aggravated
Circumstances, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 433, 438 (2008); Patrice H. Kunesh, Transcending
Frontiers: Indian Child Welfare in the United States, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 17,29 (1996).
231. Jose Monsivais, A Glimmer of Hope: A Proposal to Keep the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978 Intact, 22 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 3 (1998).
232. See Davis, supra note 230, at 438-39; DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 18, at 240-44.
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religion and culture. 3 Effectively cut off from their culture, many of these
children never returned to their families and were lost to their tribe.2"
The removal of children continued in one form or another until the 1978
passage of ICWA. Indeed, in the year before ICWA's passage, a minimum of
twenty-five percent of American Indian children were in foster care, adoptive
homes, or boarding schools, and this rate was five to twenty-five times higher
than the average for non-native children. " In some states, the rate of removal
was much higher. For instance, in the State of Washington, native children
were removed at a rate 1600% greater than non-native children.3 6 A 1969
survey of sixteen states found that eighty-five percent of native children living
in foster care were living in non-native homes. 37 Although specific statistics
on the Mississippi Choctaw are not available, it is hard to imagine-given the
high rates of removal in other tribes-they were not equally affected.
Given these rates of removal, Congress recognized that the future existence
of American Indian tribes depended on keeping their children in the tribe and
sought to establish minimum standards for any future removal of American
Indian children and for their placement in foster or adoptive homes. 38 ICWA
established tribal court jurisdiction over child custody proceedings for any
child domiciled on tribal lands and limited the ability of states to intervene.239
While the primary purpose of ICWA was to protect families from the
involuntary removal of their children, ICWA also includes provisions for tribal
233. See Davis, supra note 230, at 438.
234. See Sheri L. Hazeltine, Speedy Termination ofAlaska Native ParentalRights: The 1998
Changes to Alaska's Child in Need of Aid Statutes and Their Inherent Conflict with the
Mandates of the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 19 ALASKA L. REv. 57, 59 (2002).
235. Indian Child Welfare Program, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong. 15 (1974) (statement of William
Byler).
236. Id. at 16.
237. Id. at 15.
238. See H.R. REP.NO. 95-1386, at 11 (1978) (describing disproportionate removal ofIndian
children from their families and blaming state courts and "social workers, ignorant of Indian
cultural values and social norms [for making] decisions that are wholly inappropriate in the
context of Indian family life").
239. See 25 U.S.C § 1911 (2006). Although ICWA establishes a list of preference in
placement, nothing in ICWA prevents inter-ethnic adoption, rather it assigns jurisdiction to
tribal, not state, governments. Id. § 1915(a). Thus, ICWA's preferences for placement should
be read as an effort to keep the child in the tribe, not of prohibiting non-tribal adoption. In other
words, ICWA does not preclude the adoption of native children by non-native persons. Rather
it protects tribal jurisdiction over the adoption by recognizing the tribal courts' competency to
make custodial determinations based on their own culture and history. See Holyfield v.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. 30, 53 (1989).
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jurisdiction over voluntary adoptions.2" The inclusion of such language
indicates that Congress intended to have broader implications than stopping
involuntary removal.24' Aside from providing these needed protections,
Congress sought to incorporate the extended family concept and the group-
centered values of the native tribes, balancing individual and collective rights
against European and American Indian legal values.242
American Indian children are traditionally raised within the context of the
entire tribe and not limited to their immediate family.2" As noted above, one
value common to most tribes is greater emphasis placed on the tribe over the
individual members.2" Generally, "Indian cultures focus on the collective
rights of the community, permitting individual rights to bow more readily to
the needs of the community."'45 The result is "a world view and a concept of
group identity which create a culture within a culture, the values of which are
unknown, unnoticed, or unrecognized by those who are unacquainted with
tribal customs."2' From this tradition, American Indians are likely to identify
themselves as "part of the larger cultural group, not as completely autonomous
individuals."247 Such a holistic culture creates an extended familial obligation
in which those tribal members with child-rearing obligations are responsible
for all the tribes' children, not just their biological kin.248
As Senator James Abourezk noted at the conclusion of the 1974 Senate
hearings, it is because of the extended family concept that "in Indian
240. See 25 U.S.C. § 191 1(a),(c).
241. Christopher A. Karns, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation: State Taxation as a Means ofDiminishing the TribalLand Base, 42 AM.
U. L. REv. 1213, 1236 (1993) (describing ICWA as congressional effort to rectify "destructive
and nearly genocidal policies of previous government establishments").
242. Linda J. Lacey, The White Man's Law and the American Indian Family in the
Assimilation Era, 40 ARK. L. REV. 327, 346-69 (1986) (describing differences between
American Indian and non-native child-rearing practices and assimilative government policies
as reasons for destruction of Indian families and culture).
243. Donna J. Goldsmith, Individual vs. Collective Rights: The Indian Child Welfare Act,
13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 4 (1990).
244. Id. at 7-8 ("[M]any American Indians perceive themselves as part of the larger cultural
group, not as completely autonomous individuals. Every child belongs to both its 'nuclear'
family and to the tribe. Prior to the arrival of Anglo-Europeans in North America, an orphaned
child was virtually unheard of in Indian tribal societies.")
245. Id. at 1.
246. Edward L. Thompson, Protecting Abused Children: A Judge's Perspective on Public
Law, 1990 Deprived Child Proceedings and the Impact of the Indian Child Welfare Acts, 15
AM. INDIA4N L. REv. 1, 10 (1990).
247. Goldsmith, supra note 243, at 7.
248. B.J. JONES, THE INDIAN CHLD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK 5 (1995).
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communities throughout the Nation there is no such thing as an abandoned
child because when a child does have a need for parents for one reason or
another, a relative or a friend will take that child in. 249 Caretakers can include
aunts, uncles, and grandparents as well as great-aunts, great-uncles, and
cousins. 25' For example, among the Choctaw, the words for mother and father
are not used in reference only to one's biological parents.25 ' These terms are
also used to refer to a child's father's sisters, mother's brothers, as well as
other relatives.252 Despite changes to the Choctaw kinship system, remnants
of the traditional structure are still present and extended kinship remains an
important underlying structure of the local community. 3
This extended kin concept was not always understood or accepted by state
welfare workers.254 At the time of ICWA's passage, few removals occurred
as a result of physical abuse of the child.25 Rather, cultural differences and
bias appear to have significantly influenced the removal of American Indian
children.256 Many judges and social workers simply did not comprehend or
appreciate the value American Indians placed on the holistic tribe and
extended kin.2" Indeed, tribal leaders pointed out that removals occurred
because a social worker or judge presumed neglect when childcare was
performed by a member of the child's extended family outside the child's
nuclear family.25 s Neglect, social deprivation, and "vague allegations that
249. Indian Child Welfare Program, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 473 (1974) (statement of Sen.
James Abourezk).
250. JONES, supra note 248, at 5-6.
251. Swanton, supra note 39, at 85.
252. Alissa M. Wilson, The Best Interests of Children in the Cultural Context of the Indian
Child Welfare Act in In re: S.S. and R.S., 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 839, 841 n.21 (1997).
253. MCKEE & SCHLENKER, supra note 27, at 189-90.
254. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 238, at 11 (blaming disproportionate removal
of Indian children from their families in part on state courts' and social workers' ignorance of
Indian cultural values and social norms).
255. In two studies conducted at the time, abuse was cited as the reason for removal in one
percent of the cases. See Wilson, supra note 252, at 846 n.5.
256. For example, social workers often cited alcohol abuse as a reason for removal, yet in
those areas "where Indian and non-Indian alcoholism rates were equivalent, children were more
often removed from the Indian parents." Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, supra note 238,
at 11.
257. Goldsmith, supra note 243, at 7-8 ("[M]any American Indians perceive themselves as
part of the larger cultural group, not as completely autonomous individuals. Every child
belongs to both its 'nuclear' family and to the tribe. Prior to the arrival of Anglo-Europeans in
North America, an orphaned child was virtually unheard of in Indian tribal societies.").
258. See Annette Ruth Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children's Rights and CivilRights,
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children suffered psychological damage as a result of living with their parents"
were also offered as a basis for removing children from their families and
placing them outside the tribe.259 This "culture clash" is perhaps best
exemplified by the surprised reaction elicited from tribal communities when
non-tribal courts asserted that care givers the tribal community considered
"adequate or even excellent" were unfit and cited that unfitness as justification
for the removal." °
ICWA addresses this problem by including language that incorporates the
extended family concept.26' Specifically, the Act requires that notice of any
custody proceeding be given to the child's tribe and parent(s) or "Indian
custodian." 262 ICWA defines an "Indian custodian [as] any Indian person who
has legal custody of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or State law or
to whom temporary physical care, custody and control has been transferred by
the parent of such child. 263 ICWA further defines "extended family member
[to include one] defined by the law or custom of the Indian child's tribe or, in
the absence of such a law or custom.., a person who has reached the age of
eighteen and who is the Indian child's grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or
sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin,
or step-parent."
264
In further recognition of tribal values, Congress included language giving
the tribe a separate interest and voice in adoption proceedings, asserting that
"there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity
of Indian tribes than their children. 2 65 Further, ICWA notes the states' failure
to "recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and
social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.2 66 As a result,
the tribe has the legal standing to intervene in or even oppose an adoption for
5 NEV. L.J. 141, 145 (2004) ("In contrast to dominant mainstream cultural norms of nuclear
families and individual rights, the ICWA was designed to protect Native American expansive
conceptions of family, conceptions that did not include the notion of termination or transfer of
parental rights.").
259. Wilson, supra note 252, at 846.
260. Id.
261. See Appell, supra note 258, at 145.
262. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (2006).
263. Id. § 1903(6).
264. Id. § 1903(2).
265. Id. § 1901(3); see also Appell, supra note 258, at 145 ("ICWA was a culturally
sensitive attempt to preserve Native American cultures through their most important
resource-Indian children.").
266. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5).
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its own benefit. In fact, the Act's dual purpose-protecting the "best interests
of Indian children" and promoting "stability and security of Indian tribes and
families"--means the best interests of the child include maintaining the
stability of the tribe and, therefore, placing Indian children with tribal
members is in the best interest of those children.2 67 This conception of "the
best interests of the child" may be at odds with the view in "the non-native
social work community" that "emphasizes the importance of a child's
psychological bonding with at least one adult who is perceived by that child
as his or her psychological parent. 26' However, by including such language,
Congress allowed ICWA to reflect American Indians' valuation of tribal
community over individual rights in making custody determinations that
involve Indian children.
One area where ICWA has generated some confusion has been with respect
to which children ICWA applies. ICWA grants tribal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over "any child custody269 proceeding involving an Indian child
who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe. 27° When
children are not domiciled on tribal land, tribal jurisdiction is concurrent with
the state court.27' However, ICWA expresses a preference that state courts
transfer the proceeding to the tribal court-absent any "good cause" for the
state to retain jurisdiction and as long as the parents do not object to the
transfer-regardless of the child's place of residence.272 Although jurisdiction
is determined by the American Indian child's place of residence, or domicile,
ICWA fails to define what is implied by the word "domicile. 2 73 For American
Indians, "geographical limits of words like 'domicile' and 'residence' are not
as important . .. as the child's membership in the tribe. 27 4 The Supreme
Court took up this issue in 1989 in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, the Court's only decision to date directly addressing ICWA.275
267. Appell, supra note 258, at 145 ("ICWA, through its promotion of parental rights and
tribal sovereignty, aims to protect the very civil existence of Native Americans and tribal
governance."); Wilson, supra note 252, at 848.
268. JONES, supra note 248, at 5-6.
269. "Child custody proceedings" are defined in the act to include foster care placements,
terminations of parental rights, pre-adoption and adoption placements. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
270. Id. § 191 l(a).
271. Id. § 191 1(b).
272. Id.; see also Holyfield v. Mississippi Band ofChoctaw Indians, 490 U.S. 30,36 (1989).
273. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 43.
274. Wilson, supra note 252, at 849.
275. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 43.
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Holyfield involved the adoption of twins bom to an unmarried couple, both
of whom were enrolled members of the Choctaw Indian tribe.27 6 Although
both parents lived on the Choctaw reservation, the twins were born two
hundred miles from the reservation, the mother having traveled so as to evade
tribal-court jurisdiction.277 Both parents gave their consent to an adoption by
a non-native couple.7 ' The adoption was conducted without reference to
ICWA or the children's Choctaw status.279 Relying on ICWA, the tribe
intervened to assert its jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding. 280 The state
court held that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction because the mother had given
birth off-reservation and the children had never resided on the Choctaw
reservation."'
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed. 22  The Court found that the
children were domiciled on the Choctaw reservation and, thus, under ICWA,
the tribe had exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption.283 According to the
Court, one purpose of ICWA was to ensure "that Indian child welfare
determinations are not based on 'a white, middle-class standard,' which, in
many cases, forecloses placement with [an] Indian family."28
By way of explanation, the Supreme Court noted that congressional
hearings had focused on the negative impact the removal of children had on
the survival of tribes. 285 It further noted that the high rates of removal of
native children were the result of a lack of cultural understanding on the part
of government agencies (i.e., social workers and judges).286 The Court quoted
Choctaw Chief Isaac's 1978 hearing testimony, which aptly described the
cultural disconnect between state welfare workers and Indian tribes:
276. Id. at 37.
277. See id. at 39.
278. Id. at 37-38.
279. Id. at 38.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 38-39.
282. At the conclusion of the decision, the Court requested that the tribal court consider that
the children had spent three years--their entire lives-with their adoptive family and that the
issue was one of jurisdiction, not of placement. Id. at 53. The Court "deferred to the
experience, wisdom and compassion of the [Choctaw] tribal courts to fashion an appropriate
remedy." Id. at 54. The tribal court did allow the Holyfields' adoption of the twins to be
formalized to avoid any further disruption to their lives.
283. Id. at 53-54.
284. Id. at 37.
285. See id. at 49-51 & nn.24-25.
286. See id. at 34-35 & n.4.
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One of the most serious failings of the present system is that Indian
children are removed from the custody of their natural parents by
non-tribal government authorities who have no basis for
intelligently evaluating the cultural and social premises underlying
Indian home life and childrearing. Many of the individuals who
decide the fate of our children are at best ignorant of our cultural
values, and at worst contemptful of the Indian way and convinced
that removal, usually to a non-Indian household or institution, can
only benefit an Indian child."8 7
With its ruling in Holyfield, the Supreme Court sought to ensure that this
history of cultural misunderstanding would come to an end and that the
placement of Indian children would instead reflect the values and culture of the
tribes.288
The Court went even further, however, by incorporating a group-centered
view of legal rights favored by American Indians into a ruling directly
affecting American Indians. First, the Court confirmed an interpretation of
ICWA as protective of tribal rights, noting that "the protection of [the tribe's
interest in its children] is at the core of ICWA, which recognizes that the tribe
has an interest in the child that is distinct from but on a parity with the interest
of the parents."289 The Court went on to discuss the unique relationship
between Indian tribes and Indian children, noting that it was "a relationship
that many non-Indians find difficult to understand and that non-Indian courts
are slow to recognize."2'9  Despite the dominant culture's lack of
understanding, however, the Court declared that what is in the best interests
of the tribe is also in the best interests of the child: "The Act is based on the
fundamental assumption that it is in the Indian child's best interest that its
relationship to the tribe be protected."29' Arguably placing the tribe's interest
above that of the child's parents, the Court held that ICWA would not permit
an individual tribal member's wishes to trump the tribe's interest in the
287. Id. at 34-35(quoting Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and
Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. 191-92 (1978)).
288. Id. at 53-54.
289. Id. at 52 (quoting In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969-70 (Utah 1986)); see
also id. at 49 ("The numerous prerogatives accorded the tribes through the ICWA's substantive
provisions ... must, accordingly, be seen as a means of protecting not only the interests of
individual Indian children and families, but also of the tribes themselves.").
290. Id. (quoting In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P. 2d at 969-70).
291. Id. at 50 (quoting In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 635 P.2d 187, 189
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)).
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child.292 As the Court explained, "tribal jurisdiction... was not meant to be
defeated by the actions of individual members of the tribe, for Congress was
concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but
also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian
children adopted by non-Indians.""2 a Thus, a child's domicile was to be
determined by the residence of the mother despite her voluntary surrender of
her children.2
Holyfield remains the only Supreme Court decision directly construing
ICWA. The Court's willingness to consider tribal values and culture in its
decision making makes Holyfield an historic decision. Nearly twenty years
later, however, state court decisions threaten to undo this progress to the
detriment of tribes such as the Choctaw.
IV. Two Giant Steps Back: The Existing Indian Family Exception
The inclusion of American Indian values and beliefs in the construction of
laws that affect their lives is vital for the cultural survival of the tribes. Laws
like ICWA and decisions such as Holyfield are evidence that law can and
should be reflective of the people they directly impact. The history of the
Choctaw demonstrates why this is vital to the tribes' right to self-
determination.295 Nevertheless, in the thirty-one years since Congress passed
ICWA, several state courts have circumvented its application through court-
created exceptions.296
292. Id. at 53.
293. Id. at 49.
294. The Court based this determination on its interpretation of congressional intent for a
uniform, federal standard when it passed ICWA. See id. at 45. The Court stated that states did
not have the authority to define "domicile" because the intent of Congress, in passing ICWA,
had been to halt state actions detrimental to tribal interests. Id. Therefore, it was "most
improbable that Congress would have intended to leave the scope of the statute's key
jurisdictional provision subject to definition by state courts as a matter of state law." Id.
Allowing states to make such determinations could result in states applying their domicile law
in such a way as to circumvent the intent of ICWA. Id. The Court also noted that if the child's
domicile were not determined by the mother's domicile then few American Indian adoptions
would qualify under ICWA as few reservations possessed hospital facilities for childbirth. Id.
295. See supra Part II.
296. Courts have also relied on other exceptions, such as using the "best interests" of the
child standard, to deny transfer to tribal court. See, e.g., In re Maricopa County Juvenile
Action, 828 P.2d 1245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). Courts' reliance on this exception has been
soundly criticized. See B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act: In Search ofa Federal Forum
to Vindicate the Rights of Indian Tribes and Children Against the Vagaries of State Courts, 73
N.D. L. REv. 395, 421-29 (1997).
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One exception is the so-called "existing Indian family" exception. Under
this exception, courts refuse to apply ICWA in situations where a court deems
the child is not part of a sufficiently Indian family.297 In relying on this
exception, these state courts ignore ICWA's plain language and Supreme
Court precedent. Moreover, they threaten a return to the pre-ICWA time when
states removed children based on an outsider perspective of Indian identity and
culture.29' They also jeopardize the progress ICWA represents in restoring
control over cultural identity to the tribes.
It was just four years after ICWA's passage that the Kansas Supreme Court
created the existing Indian family exception'" as a means of avoiding the
application of ICWA. 300 In In re Baby Boy L, a child was born to a non-Indian
mother and to a father who was an enrolled member of the Kiowa Tribe of
Oklahoma.3°' When the mother attempted to voluntarily relinquish her
parental rights to allow a non-Indian couple to adopt the child, the father and
the Kiowa Tribe intervened.0 2 Arguing that ICWA applied, the father and
tribe sought to place the child within the extended family or tribe as required
by the Act. 30 3 The Kansas court rejected the tribe's argument.3°4 According
to the court, ICWA did not require "that an illegitimate infant who ha[d] never
been a member of an Indian home or culture, and probably would never be,
should be removed from its primary cultural heritage and placed in an Indian
environment over the express objections of its non-Indian mother."305 Rather,
Congress had been primarily concerned with maintaining "family and tribal
297. See Cheyafina L. Jafike, The "Existing Indian Family" Exception to the Indian Child
Welfare Act: The States'Attempt to Slaughter Tribal Interests in Indian Children, 66 LA. L.
REv. 733, 753 (2006).
298. See In re Adoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935,946 (111. 1995) (McMorrow, J., dissenting)
("The unfortunate effect of the majority's opinion is to revert to and perpetuate the regressive
State policies and practices that led Congress to enact the ICWA.").
299. See id. at 951-52 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) ("The [existing Indian family] doctrine
is actually a judicially created prerequisite to the applicability of the ICWA."). Butsee Rye v.
Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 261-62 (Ky. 1996) (holding that the "existing Indian family
exception" was not judicially created, but in fact, reflected congressional intent).
300. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In re
A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009); see also Angela M. Monguia, Part Four: Rights of Parents:
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssUEs 297, 302
(2004) (citing JONES, supra note 248, at 15).
301. SeeIn reBabyBoyL., 643 P.2d at 172.
302. See id. at 173.
303. See id. at 173-74.
304. See id at 176.
305. Id. at 175.
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relationships existing in Indian homes" and setting "minimum standards for
the removal of Indian children from their existing Indian environment.1
306
Thus, if the court found that a family was not an "existing Indian family,"
ICWA did not apply.3
7
While the majority of states have rejected the existing Indian family
exception,308 other states have opted to follow in Baby Boy L's footsteps. In
306. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2006)).
307. Id. The tribe did not seek U.S. Supreme Court review of the Kansas Supreme Court
decision. See Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587, 590 (10th Cir. 1985). Rather,
the tribe opted to collaterally challenge the decision by filing a suit in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Kansas. The tribe's suit sought to enjoin the adoption of Baby Boy L. Id.
The district court dismissed, finding that res judicata and collateral estoppel precluded
relitigating the ICWA's applicability. Id. The Tenth Circuit upheld the dismissal, id. at 593,
and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, 479 U.S. 872 (1986).
308. See e.g., In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489 (S.D. 1990) (holding that
Holyfieldinvalidated prior decision relying on existing Indian family exception and holding that
ICWA applied regardless of whether Indian child lived in Indian family). But see In re
Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d 305,310-11 (Wash. 1992) ("Holyfield supports our conviction that
ICWA is not applicable when an Indian child is not being removed from an Indian cultural
setting.... In such a situation, whether or when the child meets the definition of 'Indian child'
under ICWA is not controlling.").
309. E.g., In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692,722-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); In re Bridget
R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that existing Indian family
exception must be applied where child resided with Indian persons court deemed lacked
significant political, cultural, or social ties with tribe), superseded by statute, CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 360.6 (West 2007), as recognized in In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 722-
23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)). Section 360.6 has been repealed. 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 838 (S.B.
678) (West); In re Alexandria Y., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that ICWA
did not apply to child who had resided only for short time with Indian persons); Rye v. Weasel,
934 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1996) (refusing to apply ICWA where child had lived with her Indian
uncle and his non-Indian wife almost her entire life on ground that child had never lived with
Indian natural parents); Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331, 335 (La. Ct. App. 1995); In re
Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d at 310 (finding child was not part of existing Indian family
because neither she, nor her family, ever lived on the reservation and there were no ties to any
Indian tribe or community); In re S.C. & J.C., 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992); In re T.S.,
801 P.2d 77 (Mont. 1990); S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d. 1187, 1189 (Ala. 1990) (holding that
because the child was never part of an Indian family, never lived in an Indian home, never
experienced the Indian social and cultural world, and was born to a non-Indian mother, the
"existing Indian family exception" did not apply); In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298
(Ind. 1988); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1987) (holding ICWA
inapplicable where child had not resided in Indian family and had non-Indian mother),
superseded by statute, 10 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.3(B) (West 2007); In re Adoption of T.R.M.,
525 N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ind. 1988); In re B.B., 511 So. 2d 918,921 (Miss. 1987), rev'dsub nom.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); Claymore v. Serr, 405
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some instances, these courts have held that ICWA was unconstitutional when
applied to an Indian child not in the custody of an existing Indian family.
311
In one such case, the California Court of Appeal held that application of
ICWA would violate the Constitution's due process and equal protection
clauses unless it was limited by the existing Indian family exception.3 1 In re
Bridget R. involved twin Indian children relinquished at birth by their
parents.3" 2 Three months after their adoption, the twins' grandmother sought
to have the twins placed within their extended Indian family.313 The twins'
father also sought to rescind the adoption." 4 The Dry Creek Rancheria of
Pomo Indians, of which the father was a member, moved to intervene.3t 5
Seeking to invalidate the adoption, the twins' father and tribe argued that
ICWA should have governed placement of the twins.316
N.W.2d 650, 653 (S.D. 1987), overruled by In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489
(S.D. 1990); In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 603-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); In re Baby Boy D.,
742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985) (holding that ICWA did not apply to Indian child by non-
Indian mother when child had not resided with Indian caretaker), superseded by statute, 10
OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.3(B) (West 2007); In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 667 P.2d 228,233
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); see also Monguia, supra note 300, at 302 n.23 (listing those states that
have accepted and those that have rejected existing Indian family exception).
310. E.g., In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516 (finding that application of ICWA would
violate Fifth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments if used "to invalidate a voluntary termination
of parental rights respecting an Indian child who is not domiciled on a reservation, unless the
child's biological [parents] are not only of American Indian descent, but also maintain a
significant social, cultural or political relationship with their tribe"), superseded by statute, CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 360.6 (West 2007), as recognized in In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d
692, 722-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)). Section 360.6 has been repealed. 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch.
838 (S.B. 678) (West); In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1999) (stating that ICWA "can
serve no purpose which is sufficiently compelling to overcome the child's fundamental right
to remain in the home where he or she is loved and well cared for"); see Marcia Yablon, The
Indian Child Welfare Act Amendments of 2003, 38 FAM. L.Q. 689, 701-02 (2004). The
Supreme Court has found that using race as the sole determining factor in deciding child
custody cases is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984). However, one commentator has pointed out that because
of the "unique status of Indian Tribes as self-governing political nations and because the tribal
classification is used to remedy proven past discrimination," ICWA has remained unchallenged
on this front. Toni Hahn Davis, The Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 69 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 465, 469-70 (1993).
311. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 530.
312. Id. at 517.
313. Id. at 518.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 519 n.9.
316. Id. at 530-31.
369
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Recognizing ICWA's goal "of preserving Indian culture through the
preservation of Indian families," the court nevertheless rejected the tribe's
argument. 17 According to the court, applying ICWA to the twins' adoption
would deprive the twins of their constitutional rights of due process and equal
protection of law.3" 8 First, the court concluded that ICWA application would
deprive the twins of a fundamental due process right with respect to family
relationships.319 On that point, the court reasoned that the twins had a
fundamental and constitutionally protected right to remain in the only family
they had ever known.32° If applying ICWA would interfere with that right,
then the government was required to establish a compelling interest. 2
1
Although the court agreed that preserving Indian culture qualified as a
compelling interest, it found that interest was not implicated where neither the
twins nor their parents had maintained significant social, political, or cultural
ties with an Indian community.3 22 The court explained "that the unique values
of 'Indian culture' will not be preserved in the homes of parents who have
become fully assimilated into non-Indian culture. 323 According to the court,
Holyfield did not require that ICWA "should apply when neither the child nor
either natural parent has ever resided or been domiciled on a reservation or
maintained any significant social, cultural or political relationship with an
Indian tribe., 324 Thus, the court found no compelling interest-or even a
rational basis-to apply ICWA to "fully assimilated Indian parents" who had
sought to voluntarily relinquish their child sufficient to overcome the twins'
interest in remaining with their current family.
325
Similarly, the court held that application of ICWA would violate the twins'
right to equal protection by treating them differently from non-Indian children
absent a compelling interest.326 Having already found no such interest, the
court concluded that ICWA could not constitutionally apply.327 Finally, the
court also held that applying ICWA on these facts would violate the Tenth
317. Id. at 529-30.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 530.
320. Id. at 526.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 522.
325. Id. at 526-27.
326. Id. at 528.
327. Id.
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Amendment because it would intrude upon powers ordinarily reserved to the
states.328
Without weighing in on the constitutional questions, other courts have
simply held that ICWA did not apply if the court determined there was no
existing Indian family.329 Contrary to Holyfield and the Act's plain text, these
courts contend that the purpose of ICWA is to prevent the breakup of families
and the removal of children from parents, not to protect the tribe as a
community with its own separate, vested interest in its children.33° If there is
no existing Indian family, the courts reason, then the Act's purpose and
rationale is not served.3 Thus, ICWA is held to apply only when a child is
found by the court to be part of a recognizable Indian family or a family where
the child has been exposed to Indian culture.332 Some states have gone even
further, finding that ICWA only applies to those Indian children whose parents
are of Indian heritage and who have significant ties to the tribe.333
328. Id. at 528-29.
329. E.g., Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257,264 (Ky. 1996) (refusing to apply ICWA where
child had lived with her Indian uncle and his non-Indian wife almost her entire life on ground
that child had never lived with Indian natural parents); Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331, 335
(La. Ct. App. 1995); In re Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d 305, 310 (Wash. 1992) (finding child
was not part of existing Indian family because neither she, nor her family, ever lived on the
reservation and there were no ties to any Indian tribe or community); In re S.C. & J.C., 833 P.2d
1249 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992); In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77 (Mont. 1990); S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So.2d
1187, 1189 (Ala. 1990) (holding that because the child was never part of an Indian family, never
lived in an Indian home, never experienced the Indian social and cultural world, and was born
to a non-Indian mother, the "existing Indian family exception" did apply); In re Adoption of
T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298,303 (Ind. 1988);In re Adoption of Baby BoyD., 742 P. 2d 1059, 1064
(Okla. 1987) (holding ICWA inapplicable where child had not resided in Indian family and had
non-Indian mother), superseded by statute, 10 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.3(B) (West 2007); In re
B.B., 511 So. 2d 918, 921 (Miss. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650, 653 (S.D. 1987),
overruled by In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489 (S.D. 1990); In re S.A.M., 703
S.W.2d 603,603-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 667 P.2d 228, 233
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); see also In re Adoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935, 952 (I11. 1995)
(McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citing Davis, supra note 230, at 465).
330. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49; In re Vincent M, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 321 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (rejecting arguments that existing Indian family exception is required as matter of
constitutional law or policy).
331. See In re Adoption ofS.S., 657 N.E.2d at 952 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citing Davis,
supra note 230, at 465).
332. In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982); see also Monguia, supra note 300,
at 302 (citing JONES, supra note 248, at 15).
333. E.g., In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that
application of ICWA would violate Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments if used "to
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
372 AMERICAN INDIANLA WREVIEW [Vol. 33
For instance, in In re Crews, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that
a determination that a child meets ICWA's definition of "Indian child" is not
controlling on the issue of jurisdiction over that child's custody
determination.33 4 In that case, the child's mother, Tammy Crews, had been
uncertain of her Indian ancestry at the time of the birth of her child.335 A few
days after she relinquished her parental rights, Crews attempted to invalidate
the adoption after finding that she was in fact an eligible member of the
Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma.336 Joined by the Choctaw, Crews argued that
ICWA should have governed the adoption of her child.337
The Washington Supreme Court disagreed.33' According to the court, even
though Crews's child was an "Indian child" under ICWA and the Choctaw
invalidate a voluntary termination of parental rights respecting an Indian child who is not
domiciled on a reservation, unless the child's biological [parents] are not only of American
Indian descent, but also maintain a significant social, cultural or political relationship with their
tribe"); In re Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d at 310-11 (finding that determination that child meets
ICWA's definition of "Indian child" is not controlling); see Jafike, supra note 297, at 753;
Yablon, supra note 310, at 701-02. Courts have gone to rather extraordinary lengths to avoid
ICWA's application. In response to In re Bridget, the California legislature passed California
Welfare and Institution Code section 360.6, which required a finding of significant tribal
affiliation when a child fell within ICWA's definition of an Indian child. See In re Santos Y.,
92 Cal. App. 4th 1274, 1311-12 & n.18 (2002). Despite this, a California Court of Appeals
again applied strict scrutiny analysis to conclude that ICWA did not apply in the adoption of
a child who met ICWA's definition of"Indian child." Id. at 1315-16. The court concluded that
section 360.6 did not alter the analysis of In re Bridget because California had no independent
authority over Indian tribes and its interest in protecting Indian culture was identical to that of
the United States. Id. at 1316-17. According to the court, that interest was not served by
application of ICWA. Id. at 1317. California later repealed section 360.6 by passing Family
Code section 170, which went beyond the earlier statute to codify ICWA into state law, making
ICWA's application mandatory under Public Law 280. CAL. FAM. CODE § 170 (historical and
statutory notes); see Daniel Albaflil Adlong, The Terminator Terminates Terminators: Governor
Schwarzenegger's Signature, SB 678, and How California Attempts to Abolish the Existing
Indian Family Exception and How Other States Should Follow, 7 APPALACHIAN J. L. 109, 129
(2007). Under section 170, California sought to encourage and protect Indian children's tribal
membership and community connection notwithstanding a child's domicile, whether the
parental rights have been terminated, or whether the child is in the physical custody of an Indian
parent. CAL. FAM. CODE § 175(a)(2); see Adlong, supra, at 333. Tribal determinations that a
child is a tribal member or eligible for membership is binding on the state court. CAL. FAm.
CODE § 175©.
334. In re Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d at 310-11.
335. Id. at 307.
336. Id. at 307-08.
337. Id.
338. Seeid. at310.
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Constitution, ICWA did not apply.339 Important to the court was its conclusion
that the child's mother had not resided on or near the Choctaw reservation and
did not intend to do so in the future.34 ° Thus, the court found that because the
mother had "shown no substantive interest in her Indian heritage in the past
and has given no indication this will change in the future" application of
ICWA would not further the Acts policies or purposes.' In so doing, the
court not only avoided ICWA application, it denied the child her own Indian
heritage.
In so ruling, the court disregarded the Choctaw's interest in custody
disputes involving Choctaw children as well as the Supreme Court precedent
laid out in Holyfield. Indeed, despite the similar facts of both cases, the
Washington court actually cited Holyfield in support of its conclusion that
ICWA did not apply to the voluntary adoption of an Indian child by an Indian
parent.34 2 Crews has been roundly criticized as having "endorsed the notion
that [a state court] should be the ultimate arbiter of whether a person,
irrespective of membership or qualification of membership in an Indian tribe,
should be considered an Indian based upon the state court's perception of
whether that person had sufficient contacts with his or her Indian heritage.
343
In other words, a state court could avoid ICWA application to an Indian child
based on the court's determination that the child's parent was not sufficiently
"Indian."344
Fortunately, the majority of states have rejected the existing Indian family
exception. 345 Nevertheless, there is still cause for concern. First, state courts
339. See id.
340. See id.
341. Id.
342. Id. ("Holyfield supports our conviction that ICWA is not applicable when an Indian
child is not being removed from an Indian cultural setting, the natural parents have no
substantive ties to a specific tribe, and neither the parents nor their families have resided or plan
to reside within a tribal reservation."); Jones, supra note 296, at 411.
343. Jones, supra note 296, at 410-11.
344. Id.
345. See In re Suzanna L., 104 Cal. App. 4th 223, 234 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Michael J. Jr.
v. Michael J. Sr., 7 P.3d 960, 963 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (finding compelling interest in
preserving Indian families, protecting tribe's interest in welfare of Indian children, and
maintaining of tribal culture furthered by ICWA); In re Alicia S., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 121, 123
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding ICWA applies when removing Indian child regardless of whether
family has significant relationship with Indian community); In re D.A.C., 933 P.2d 993, 999
(Utah App. 1997); In re Adoption of Riffle, 922 P.2d 510 (Mont. 1996); In re Elliott, 554
N.W.2d 32 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925 (Idaho 1993); Quinn v.
Walters, 845 P.2d 206, 209 n.2 (Or. App. 1993); In re Adoption of S.S., 622 N.E.2d 832, 834
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that rely on the existing Indian family exception to avoid application of ICWA
do so by ignoring Congress's intent in enacting ICWA as well as the plain
language of ICWA itself.3" Through ICWA, Congress sought to minimize
state involvement in Indian custody cases.347 Such action was necessary
because states had too "often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations
of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian
communities and families. 34s Congress vested tribal courts with jurisdiction
to adjudicate child placement cases as a means to end state removal of Indian
children and placement into non-Indian homes.349 Moreover, Congress
explicitly rejected language that would have required "significant contacts" for
ICWA to apply to a child not living on a reservation. 350 Baby Boy L. and its
progeny ignore this history.
Indeed, rather than focus on families and the tribe, the existing Indian
family exception ignores the relationship between the child and tribe to focus
entirely on the family.35" ' But, Congress did not mean for ICWA to only
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993), reversedon other grounds, 657 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. 1995); In re Adoption of
Lindsay C., 280 Cal. Rptr. 194,201 (Ct. App. 1991); In re N.S., 474 N.W.2d 96, 100 n.8 (S.D.
1991) (Sabers, J., concurring); In re Oscar C. Jr., 559 N.Y.S. 2d 431 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990); In
re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489 (S.D. 1990) (rejecting existing Indian family
exception and holding ICWA applies when "Indian child" is subject of "child custody
proceeding" as those terms are defined in ICWA); In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973
(Alaska 1989); In re Coconino County, 741 P.2d 1218 (Ariz. 1987); In re Adoption of a Child
of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988); In re T.J.J., 366 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d 311 (Iowa 1984); In re Junious M., 144 Cal. App. 3d 786,796
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983); see also Jennifer L. Walters, Comment, In Re Elliott: Michigan's
Interpretation and Rejection of the Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 633, 639 (1997); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 170
(requiring application of ICWA when child fits ICWA's definition of"Indian child" irrespective
of significant ties to tribe); 10 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.3(B) (West 2007) ("Except as provided
for in subsection A of this section, the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act applies to all state
voluntary and involuntary child custody court proceedings involving Indian children, regardless
of whether or not the children involved are in the physical or legal custody of an Indian parent
or Indian custodian at the time state proceedings are initiated.").
346. See In re Adoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935,953 (Ill. 1995) (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
347. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2006).
348. Id.; see also id. § 1902 ("[ICWA is designed] to protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the
establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the
unique values of Indian culture.").
349. Carriere, supra note 7, at 589.
350. In re Adoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 951-52 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
351. Jafike, supra note 297, at 745. See e.g., Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 263 (Ky.
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protect Indian families. If it had, it would not have included provisions
expressly protecting a tribe's interest in shielding Indian children from the
vagaries of state-court decision making that disregarded and disrupted tribal
culture. 52 Congress did, however, include those protections. 3
Further, Holyfield makes clear that the focus of the ICWA analysis is not
solely the individual Indian family, but also the tribe's legitimate interest in the
adoption of Indian children." According to the Court, ICWA was crafted to
serve tribal interests precisely because of the "impact on the tribes themselves
of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians.""35 Thus,
ICWA's protections were rightly viewed "as a means of protecting not only
the interests of individual Indian children and families, but also of the tribes
themselves." '356 Indeed, in finding that ICWA applied, the Holyfield Court
signaled that the tribe's interest would be protected even when it conflicted
with the express desire of the child's parents.357 Even though the mother had
sought to ensure that her twin children were born outside the reservation and
voluntarily surrendered them to state custody, the Court found ICWA could
not be avoided by the unilateral actions of the child's parents.35
Perhaps even more important, Holyfield held that the tribe should rightfully
decide the children's placement even though the children in that case had not
been raised in an Indian household. 59 By the time of the Court's decision, the
1996) ("The important part of the ICWA was the preservation of the existing Indian family.").
352. See Jones, supra note 296, at 429 ("The 'existing Indian family' exception ignores
tribal interests in maintaining connections with its only means of survival: its children.").
353. See Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2006); see also Appell, supra
note 258, at 145 ("ICWA was a culturally sensitive attempt to preserve Native American
cultures through their most important resource-Indian children."); Wilson, supra note 252, at
848.
354. Holyfield v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989) ("The
numerous prerogatives accorded the tribe through the ICWA's substantive provision.., must,
accordingly, be seen as a means of protecting not only the interests of individual Indian children
and families, but also of the tribes themselves.").
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 48-49 (rejecting contention that ICWA jurisdiction was defeated by mother's
voluntary surrender of her children to state authorities on ground that ICWA could not be
avoided through actions of individual tribal members).
358. Id. at 53 ("[T]he law of domicile Congress used in the ICWA cannot be one that
permits individual reservation-domiciled tribal members to defeat the tribe's exclusive
jurisdiction by the simple expedient of giving birth and placing the child for adoption off the
reservation.").
359. See id. ("We are not unaware that over three years have passed since the twin babies
were born and placed in the Holyfield home, and that a court deciding their fate today is not
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children had been living in a non-Indian household for their entire lives. 60
During that time the twins had undoubtedly developed strong familial ties with
their adoptive family.36' Moreover, they had apparently had no significant ties
to the Choctaw tribe.362 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that ICWA applied
and that jurisdiction belonged to the tribe3 3 The Holyfield Court's repeated
emphasis on tribal interests is inconsistent with the existing Indian family
exception, which focuses entirely on the Indian family as the basis for
determining ICWA applicability.3"
By requiring "substantial ties," state courts are imposing a requirement for
ICWA application that goes beyond the Act's plain-language requirements.
ICWA was intended to govern involuntary and voluntary child custody
proceedings involving Indian children.3 65 By its own terms, ICWA requires
two things to apply: (1) that the "Indian child" be either an enrolled member
of an Indian tribe or eligible for membership and the biological child of a tribal
member, and (2) that the child be involved in a child custody proceeding as
that term is defined by ICWA.3" Under the existing Indian family exception,
however, courts also ask whether the child's parent or parents have
participated in tribal life or have significant political, social, or cultural ties to
the tribe. 67 This inquiry represents a return to the pre-ICWA era because it
permits the courts to impose an outsider's set of standards on another culture
as state courts, rather than the tribes, determine the adequacy of the tribal
affiliation.368
writing on a blank slate in the same way it would have in January 1986.").
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. See id.
363. Id.
364. See Roger A. Tellinghuisen, The Indian Child Welfare Act of1978: A Practical Guide
With [Limited] Commentary, 34 S.D.L. REv. 660,671 (1989) ("After the decision in Holyfield,
it appears that the Kansas court in Baby Boy L. may have given inappropriate weight to the
wishes of the family.").
365. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i-iv) (2006); In re Adoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935,953 (Ill.
1995) (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
366. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4),(5) (2006).
367. See In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982); In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr.
2d 507, 515-16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
368. See Quinn v. Walters, 845 P.2d 206, 209 n.2 (Or. App. 1993) ("Engrafting a new
requirement into ICWA that allows the dominant society to judge whether the parent's cultural
background meets its view of what 'Indian culture' should be puts the state courts right back
into the position from which Congress has removed them."); In re D.A.C., 933 P.2d 993, 999
(Utah App. 1997); see also Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare
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Such an approach flies in the face of Supreme Court precedent regarding a
tribe's right to determine its own membership. In searching for significant
ties, these courts substitute their judgment in questions that reach the core of
tribal identity-who is a tribal member. 69 Seizing authority to determine
whether a particular family has significant ties to the tribe in order to decide
who is (or is not) sufficiently connected to be a member of that tribe makes
states the final arbiter of who is sufficiently "Indian" for tribal membership.370
But, states are not the proper guardians of Indian identity. Rather, tribal
membership is properly determined on the basis of tribal customs, values, and
laws.37' Allowing states to determine membership eligibility places a limit on
tribal sovereignty not contemplated by Congress and long rejected by the
Supreme Court.37 Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld the right of tribes to
establish their own criteria for tribal membership, holding that the authority of
a tribe to make these determinations is "central to its existence as an
independent political community. 373
Further, state courts' perceptions of Indian culture can be just as misguided
as the perceptions of the social workers and state officials who removed Indian
children from their homes during the pre-ICWA era. Rejecting what they
perceive as "token attestations of cultural identity" as inadequate to form a
tribal relationship, these courts search the parents' and child's activities to
discern connections sufficient to satisfy the court's perceptions regarding
Indian culture.3 74 Thus, for ICWA to apply, the parent or child must "adopt
[Indian] culture as a day to day way of life., 375
But the requirement that the parent or child adopt "Indian culture" is based
on the flawed assumption that there is one "Indian culture." The reality is that
there are as many different tribal cultures as there are Indian tribes in the
United States.3 76 Because of this diversity, there can be no one test for whether
a particular child or parent is sufficiently Indian. This is precisely why such
decisions are best left to the individual tribe. Nevertheless, in ascertaining
Act: Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587,633 (2002).
369. Adlong, supra note 333, at 129; Christine Metteer, Hard Cases Making BadLaw: The
Needfor Revision of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 419,421 (1998).
370. Jones, supra note 296, at 429 ("[T]he existing Indian family exception interferes with
the tribal prerogative to define its own membership.").
371. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978).
372. See id.
373. Id. at 72 n.32.
374. See In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
375. Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 263 (Ky. 1996).
376. Jaffke, supra note 297, at 753.
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whether a family is sufficiently "Indian," courts have required that the parent
or child participate in a laundry list of tribal activities.377 Explained by one
court, to find sufficient significant ties, the parents must have
privately identified themselves as Indians and privately observed
tribal customs and, among other things, whether, despite their
distance from the reservation, they participated in tribal community
affairs, voted in tribal elections, or otherwise took an interest in
tribal politics, contributed to tribal or Indian charities, subscribed
to tribal newsletters or other periodicals of special interest to
Indians, participated in Indian religious, social, cultural or political
events which are held in their own locality, or maintained social
contacts with other members of the Tribe.378
It is unlikely, however, that any list can capture the hallmarks of cultural
identity as most defy enumeration. Further, state courts should not be in the
business of crafting lists of indicia of tribal affiliation that are devoid of any
tribal input. In so doing, these states are substituting their judgment for that
of the tribe and imposing an outsider view of Indian culture that may have
little relevance to the tribe itself. Indeed, there is no suggestion by the court
that activities listed are significant to the tribe's culture or to its determinations
of tribal membership. Permitting a state to impose its view of "Indianness"
permits a return to the pre-ICWA days when laws premised on Anglo-
American cultural viewpoints were imposed without regard for tribal values.
Finally, it is difficult to shake the notion that few people in any particular
group would pass such a cultural litmus test.
Rather than concern for cultural participation, state court decisions to avoid
ICWA application appear to be motivated at least in part by concern that the
tribal court will not act in the best interests of the child.379 But, it is important
to bear in mind that ICWA does not require a particular placement.8 Rather,
377. See In reBridgetR., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531.
378. See id.
379. See Carriere, supra note 7, at 629 ("[T]he assumption that tragic outcomes will more
likely occur when jurisdiction lies with tribal courts rather than with state courts bespeaks a
blindness both to the values and to the level of efficiency attained by the Euro-American child
welfare system."); Yablon, supra note 310, at 706.
380. See Holyfield v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. 30, 53 (1989)
("Whatever feelings we might have as to where the twins should live, however, it is not for us
to decide that question. We have been asked to decide the legal question of who should make
the custody determination concerning these children-not what the outcome of that
determination should be."); In re Adoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935, 953 (Ill. 1995)
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it vests the tribal court with the authority to make the custody determination."'
Thus, the courts' concern over the ultimate placement decision is not a proper
basis for determining jurisdiction.3"2 Moreover, the concern bespeaks of a
distrust of tribal judicial decision making that is unwarranted.
As ICWA acknowledges, tribal courts are better positioned to respect tribal
traditions and culture in cases involving adoption or involuntary termination
of parental rights.383 But denying jurisdiction every time a state court is
concerned that a tribal court might not reach the same result could pressure
tribal courts to comport their decisions with non-Indian cultural values in an
effort to stave off future state court refusals to apply ICWA.3"
For instance, as noted above, the traditional extended kinship structure
remains an important part of Indian families. Despite this, state courts have
focused on the nuclear family model of child rearing to the exclusion of other
family members, denying ICWA application where a child was placed with
extended kin.38 5 In a case reminiscent of the time when state court ignorance
of the extended family concept resulted in the removal of Indian children from
their tribes,386 the Kentucky Supreme Court refused to recognize the tribe's
designation of an extended family member as the child's guardian.387 In Rye
v. Weasel, the court held that a child raised by her uncle and his non-Indian
spouse as a ward of the tribe had not been raised in an "Indian" home, even
though her uncle was a tribal member and had been deemed an "Indian
custodian" by the tribe, which placed the child in his care.388
(McMorrow, J., dissenting).
381. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 53 ("The law places that decision in the hands of the
Choctaw tribal court."); In reAdoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d at 953 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
382. Id. ("It is not ours to say whether the trauma that might result from removing these
children from their adoptive family should outweigh the interest of the Tribe-and perhaps the
children themselves-in having them raised as part of the Choctaw community. Rather, 'we
must defer to the experience, wisdom, and compassion of the [Choctaw] tribal courts to fashion
an appropriate remedy."') (quoting In re Adoption of Holloway, 732 P.2d 962, 972 (Utah
1986)).
383. See id. at 54; Atwood, supra note 7, at 647-49.
384. Jones, supra note 296, at 429 ("Tribal courts may eventually be compelled to conform
their placement decisions to appease non-Indian judges, who often times have an archetype of
a family setting that best meets the needs of all children, just to facilitate the exercise of their
transfer jurisdiction.").
385. Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 263 (Ky. 1996); see also Jones, supra note 296, at
418-19.
386. See text accompanying supra notes 254-60.
387. Rye, 934 S.W.2d at 260.
388. Id. Under ICWA, an Indian custodian is to be treated as the child's parent. See 25
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Ignoring the uncle's tribal membership, the court held that the child had
never lived in an Indian family because the child's parents were unmarried and
the child's mother had lost contact with her child after placing her with the
custodial parents. 389 Although the tribe considered the uncle a tribal member,
the court found him lacking for his failure to adopt what the court
characterized as Indian "culture as a day to day way of life. '39" Thus, when the
uncle divorced, the state court granted custody to his non-Indian spouse after
concluding that it was in the child's best interests under Kentucky's custody
statute.39'
As this case amply demonstrates, when state courts use the exiting Indian
family exception to avoid ICWA, they perpetuate the very injustice ICWA
sought to remedy by permitting nontribal members to determine the
boundaries of Indian families. Such efforts may pressure tribal courts to
conform to an outsider's cultural perspective by minimizing extended kin roles
to fit within the nuclear family framework so as to assuage state court
concerns. Moreover, these decisions have the potential to further alter Indian
kinship structures, such as the Choctaw's, so that it even more closely
resembles the Anglo-American model, not as a consequence of cultural choice,
but as a means to avoid state usurpation of tribal jurisdiction.
The reluctance of some state courts to follow ICWA's dictates is perhaps
understandable when one considers that family law matters, such as child
custody, have typically been a matter of state law.392 Nevertheless, ICWA
divests states of jurisdiction over this traditional area of state law in matters
involving Indian child custody. 393 Moreover, the Supreme Court has made it
clear that Congress has plenary power over tribes and that states have no
authority to interfere with tribal affairs.394 Given the Court's persistent
rejection of state involvement over internal tribal matters, a state court's
reliance on the existing Indian family exception to avoid ICWA application is
nothing short of a grab for power not rightly resting with the states.
U.S.C. § 1903(6) (2006).
389. Rye, 934 S.W.2d at 263.
390. Id. It was also important to the court that the child's parents had little contact with her
or the tribe, that the child had not lived on the reservation, and that the tribe had not paid for her
support or medical care. Id. at 263-64. None of these is required for ICWA application.
391. Id. at 264.
392. See Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987).
393. See 25 U.S.C § 1911 (2006); Holyfield v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490
U.S. 30, 53 (1989).
394. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,319 (1978); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 551-52 (1974); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
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It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will wade into the issue given that the
Court has denied certiorari in at least eight cases involving application of the
existing Indian exception.395 Thus, this problem calls out for an appropriate
congressional response. Although the full Congress has not taken up ICWA
since its passage,396 it has repeatedly refused to codify the existing Indian
family exception. First, in passing ICWA, Congress rejected language that
would have required "substantial ties" for ICWA to apply to a child not living
on a reservation.397 Further, soon after the California Court of Appeal's
decision in Bridget R., that state's U.S. Representative sought to amend ICWA
to codify the existing Indian family exception."' The proposed change would
have gone further than Bridget R. by excluding ICWA application when a
child's parents were deemed to lack sufficient ties to an Indian tribe
irrespective of whether the child was a member of the tribe.3 The proposed
amendment was never given a full vote.' °
Rather than embrace the exception, Congress has increasingly moved in the
opposite direction. More recent proposed changes to ICWA have sought to
bolster tribal court competency to adjudicate custody matters. For instance,
one amendment put forth would require that state courts give full faith and
credit to "judicial proceedings, and tribal court judgments; and to such other
proceedings, including divorce proceedings, as may involve the determination
of an Indian child's custody."'" In another sign of progress, the latest round
395. Yablon, supra note 310, at 705.
396. There have been fourteen attempts to amend ICWA since its passage. Only one of
these amendments has come up for a full vote, and even in that instance, the vote was held only
in the Senate. To date, ICWA has never been amended. Kirk Albertson, Applying Twenty-Five
Years of Experience: The Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 193, 196 &
n.26 (2004-2005) (listing proposed amendments); see also Jones, supra note 296, at 413 n.90
(describing efforts of tribal leaders and critics of ICWA to revise the Act to stave off further
judicial assaults).
397. In re Adoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935, 951-52 (111. 1995) (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
398. Jones, supra note 296, at 413 n.89; see also A Bill to Amend the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978, S. 1962, 104th Cong. (1996). Other amendments would have placed time limits
on a tribe's right to intervene in a state court proceeding affecting an Indian child, see Indian
Child Welfare Act Amendment of 1996, H.R. 3828, 104th Cong. (1996), and exempt voluntary
child custody proceedings from ICWA, see Voluntary Adoption Protection Act, H.R. 3156,
104th Cong. (1996). Neither amendment passed.
399. Jones, supra note 296, at 413 n.89; see also A Bill to Amend the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978, S. 1962.
400. Jones, supra note 296, at 413 n.89.
401. See Yablon, supra note 310, at 699 (quoting H.R. 2750, 108th Cong. (2003)). Such a
step is necessary because, in many cases, state courts have refused to accord full faith and credit
to tribal court decisions that impact child custody proceedings.
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of proposed amendments to ICWA did not include a provision to codify the
existing Indian family exception. 2
While it is commendable that Congress has refused to codify the existing
Indian family exception, clearly that is not enough to stop states from relying
on the exception to avoid ICWA. Rather, Congress must explicitly reject this
exception. In short, Congress should amend ICWA to make clear that the Act
applies to Indian children regardless of their parents' ties to their tribes.
Permitting states to continue to avoid ICWA's application by defining who is
sufficiently Indian once again threatens to permit an outsider culture to
regulate another from without by placing it within legal constraints not of its
own creation. It also permits states to ignore Congress's repeated refusal to
incorporate the exception into the Act. Lest Congress appear to acquiesce,
Congress needs to act.
In crafting the proposed change, Congress should follow the example set by
California. After that state's opinion in Bridget R., the legislature responded
by making tribal interests more explicit and by requiring that ICWA govern
custody proceedings involving Indian children regardless whether theirparents
are found to maintain "significant ties" with their tribe. °3 Rather, California
courts considering Indian custody proceedings must "strive to promote the
stability and security of Indian tribes and families, comply with the federal
Indian Child Welfare Act, and seek to protect the best interest of the child."'
To facilitate this, courts are to presume that it is in the best interest of Indian
children that their tribal membership "and connection to the tribal community
be encouraged and protected, regardless . . . [w]hether the child is in the
physical custody of an Indian parent or Indian custodian at the commencement
of a child custody proceeding[, w]hether the parental rights of the child's
parents have been terminated[, w]here the child has resided or been
domiciled." ' 5 Most importantly, a tribe's determination that a child is a tribal
member or eligible for membership is binding on the state court and requires
ICWA application. 4
402. Id. at 701.
403. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 170(d)(2), 175 (2007).
404. Id. § 175(b).
405. Id. § 175(a)(2).
406. Id. § 175(c) ("A determination by an Indian tribe that an unmarried person, who is
under the age of 18 years, is either (1) a member of an Indian tribe or (2) eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe and a biological child of a member of an Indian tribe shall
constitute a significant political affiliation with the tribe and shall require the application of the
federal Indian Child Welfare Act to the proceedings.").
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By taking such an approach, Congress would strengthen ICWA's protection
of Indian tribes and families, ensuring that ICWA serves the purposes
Congress intended by protecting the best interests of Indian children,
promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes and families, and ensuring
that the removal of Indian children from their homes would "reflect the unique
values of Indian culture.""4 7 By rejecting a requirement of "significant ties,"
it would also prevent state courts from applying an outsider's criteria on what
ties are culturally important to a particular tribe. Further, by making tribal
membership determinations binding on state courts, such an amendment would
solidify the tribes' role in custody proceedings involving Indian children.
Thus, Congress would send a clear message that state courts cannot continue
to graft new requirements onto ICWA that thwart the Act's goals and
Congress's intent to permit tribes to control their cultural future.
More important, Congress would also forestall further imposition of Anglo-
American legal norms on Indian tribes. As the history of the Choctaw makes
clear, when law is imposed without input or respect for American Indian
values and beliefs, it can profoundly alter the culture of the tribe. At its
essence, law should reflect and embody a culture's values. To do that, law
must come from the culture it is to govern. But, when law is imposed by one
group on another without respect for the oppressed group's values, it subjects
that group to the values and norms of the dominant group."°s In that way, law
becomes a colonizing tool that forces the subjugated group to conform to
another culture's expectations and beliefs. While the changes the Choctaw
kinship structure experienced cannot be entirely explained by the imposition
of U.S. law, it is difficult to ignore the profound effect such laws have had on
the Choctaw and other tribes. The cost of not taking action is simply too great
for Congress and the Supreme Court to continue to sidestep.
Conclusion
In the four centuries since de Soto first arrived in the southeast of North
America, the Mississippi Choctaw have been increasingly influenced by the
culture of European colonists and Anglo-Americans. Choctaw culture has
undergone many changes, some of which were instigated by the need to adapt
or resist laws that failed to account for or reflect their cultural values or beliefs.
407. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2006).
408. Carriere, supra note 7, at 592 (noting that when law prescribes it "casts the shadow of
the legal subject beyond its internal discursive confines by imposing it on other cultural
artifacts."); see also Atwood, supra note 7, at 578.
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The shift from a matrilineal, clan-based society to a patrilineal, nuclear family
model is one such change. While it may not be entirely a result of Anglo legal
influence, U.S. law clearly had an effect on this cultural shift.
As a product of the shared history of American Indian and Euro-American
culture, ICWA provided some relief from this history by permitting tribes to
make legal decisions that go to the heart of tribal identity and survival. State
court efforts to avoid application of ICWA through the existing Indian family
exception signal a return to the pre-ICWA period, a time when U.S. law
prescribed, rather than reflected, American Indian culture. For the continued
vitality of the tribes, state courts must reject this incursion into ICWA's
protections. More important, Congress must step in and explicitly reject court
created exceptions to ICWA that would permit an outside culture to regulate
another from without by placing it within legal constraints not of its own
creation. By failing to act, Congress permits the states to continue to flout its
intent in providing for a law that permits the tribes some measure of control
over their cultural future.
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